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IINTRODUCTION
As we enter the second decade of the 21st Century, we find ourselves at a
rare historical moment-a time of great opportunity fraught with substantial
pitfalls. Numerous potential trajectories of the Internet may unfold before us.
While decentralized and participatory platforms have birthed a revived move-
ment for democratized media production, these phenomena depend on the
common resource of the Internet; common not in ownership of the integrated
networks, but in non-discriminatory access and use of the network.' However,
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as markets evolve, there is a growing uncertainty that policy decisions sur-
rounding the Internet will benefit the general public. Even as social networking
and media production have empowered users, less visible structural changes
threaten to foreclose many of the Internet's democratic possibilities. Despite
the popularity and political power of innovative services like YouTube, Face-
book, and Twitter, structural changes threaten to foreclose many of the Inter-
net's democratic possibilities. Furthermore, recent developments in digital
rights management ("DRM"), net neutrality, and user privacy reveal unprece-
dented attacks on basic Internet freedoms.
The Internet ecosystem includes a diverse array of stakeholders who build
and depend upon each other's participation. Data transmission depends on ac-
cess to the physical network, and application functionality depends on the
transport of data. As a result, numerous entities-such as network operators
and protocol developers-have the power to define the end-user experience.
Unfortunately, this ability to intervene can have profound implications for the
flow of information, the functionality of applications or hardware, and the spe-
cific content or messages allowed over a network. While some scholars con-
tinue to herald the brave new world of digital networks,2 others suggest more
cautionary tales of lost opportunities, market failure, and corporate misman-
agement.3 With this tension in mind, this paper examines a number of recent
and ongoing Internet policy battles that will determine the future of the Inter-
net's fundamental structures. If history serves as a reliable predictor, these cru-
cial debates will help shape the contours of the Internet for decades, if not gen-
erations, to come.
These threats come at an unfortunate time. The U.S. has plummeted in its in-
ternational rankings on broadband penetration rates in recent years, indicating
that something has undermined the participatory ideal of universal broadband
connectivity. Not long ago, the U.S. was a leader in Internet adoption.' An Oc-
2 See YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 2 (Yale Univ. Press 2006). The author notes:
Together, [technological changes] hint at the emergence of a new information envi-
ronment, one in which individuals are free to take a more active role than was possible
in the industrial information economy of the twentieth century. This new freedom
holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as a platform for
better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and self-reflective
culture; and, in an increasingly information dependent global economy, as a mecha-
nism to achieve improvements in human development everywhere.
Id.
3 JEFF CHESTER, DIGITAL DESTINY: NEW MEDIA AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 173
(New Press 2007); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS
OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 36, 158-160 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); TIM Wu, THE MASTER
SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 255-256 (Knopf Press 2010).
4 See International Broadband Data, ORG. FOR ECoN. COOPERATION AND DEV.
(OECD) (2008), http://www.freepress.net/files/international-broadband-data.pdf (citing data
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tober 2000 report by the Danish National IT and Telecom Agency estimated
that the United States was "12-24 months ahead of any European Country" in
terms of broadband penetration and access.' By 2010, the United States slipped
to 14th, based on OECD ranking, for overall nationwide broadband penetra-
tion, while Denmark was first.' These are just a few of the indicators of the
worsening digital divide, part of a longer list that we catalog below.
Furthermore, in most markets across the U.S., people must choose between
one cable provider and one telephone company for their Internet services.'
This lack of choice and competition is one of the key reasons that U.S. broad-
band services currently lag behind a growing number of other industrialized
countries and why service is often substandard.!
This significant market failure largely accounts for the fact that Americans
typically pay several times more a month for a fraction of the broadband
speeds available in other countries. In 2010, a typical 50 Mbps connection in
the United States cost as much as $145 a month, compared with $60 a month
in Japan, $29 a month in South Korea, and $38 month in Hong Kong.' In Swe-
broadband penetration data available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/53/41551452.xls).
5 EIRWEN NicHos, ZETA TSATSANI & ELIZABETH HARDING, THE STATUS OF BROADBAND
ACCESS SERVICES FOR CONSUMERS AND SMEs 4 (Oct. 2000), available at
http://en.itst.dk/policy-strategy/publications/the-status-of-broadband-access-services-for-
consumers-and-
smes/The%20status%200fO/o20broadband%20access%20services%20for/o2Oconsumers%20
and%20SMEs.pdf.
6 See OECD Broadband Statistics - OECD Fixed Broadband Subscriptions Per 100
Inhabitants June 2010, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/35/39574709.xls (last visited May 14, 2011).
7 The National Broadband Plan released by the Federal Communications Commission
notes that 96% of Americans have a choice of 2 or fewer wireline broadband providers. See
FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37
(2010), available at http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan [hereinafter NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN].
9 See YOCHAl BENKLER, HARVARD BERKMAN CTR FOR INTERNET AND SOC'Y 36 (2010)
[hereinafter BERKMAN REPORT], available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/broadband; JAMES LOSEY & CHIEHYU Li, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION, PRICE OF THE PIPE: COMPARING THE PRICE OF BROADBAND SERVICE
AROUND THE GLOBE 1-2 (April 2010) (stating that a "[f]ack of competition is a major factor
influencing the higher prices and slower speeds found in the U.S" and that "prices are higher
when only one or two providers are available."), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Price%20of%/20the%20Pi
pe 0.pdf . Internet service is also the third most common consumer complaint received by
the Federal Trade Commission. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases List
of Top Consumer Complaints in 2010; Identity Theft Tops the List Again (Mar. 8, 2011)
(available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/topcomplaints.shtm).
9 JAMES LOSEY & CHIEHYU LI, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, PRICE OF THE PIPE:
COMPARING THE PRICE OF BROADBAND SERVICE AROUND THE GLOBE 1-2 (April 2010),
available at
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Price%200f%/20the%2OPi
pe_0.pdf.
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den, open access networks have created vibrant competitive markets, as evi-
denced by the drop in price for 100 Mbps symmetric lines to $46/month in
Stockholm.o These figures and other studies" suggest that Americans could
have access to faster, cheaper broadband connectivity if the U.S. implemented
similar open policies. When the marketplace fosters competition, prices drop
and broadband speeds increase dramatically.
The cost and availability of broadband is only a part of the dilemma. Net-
work operators further contribute to the problem by resisting the implementa-
tion of network management techniques that increase capacity, choosing in-
stead to ration "existing capacity among competing network users or uses." 2
In the U.S., users might share a local node with over two hundred other con-
nections," and experience average speeds that are half the advertised price. 4
If these trends continue, the Internet will devolve into a feudalized space-
one that limits democratic freedoms while enriching an oligopoly of powerful
gatekeepers. This article illuminates the specific policy debates connected to
these vulnerabilities, while uncovering normative understandings about the
role of the Internet in a democratic society. Using the seven-layer OSI model
as a framework, our analysis catalogs current threats to this telecommunica-
tions commons and examines the policy provisions that should be implemented
to prevent the feudalization of the Internet. By cataloging current threats to a
democratic Internet and closely examining the linkages between intersecting
policy battles, this paper illuminates both what is at stake and what policy pro-
o Id.
" See BERKMAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 13. As Benkler concludes,
Our most surprising and significant finding is that 'open access' policies-unbundling,
bitstream access, collocation requirements, wholesaling, and/or functional separation-
are almost universally understood as having played a core role in the first generation
transition to broadband in most of the high performing countries; that they now play a
core role in planning for the next generation transition; and that the positive impact of
such policies is strongly supported by the evidence of the first generation broadband
transition. The importance of these policies in other countries is particularly surprising
in the context of U.S. policy debates throughout most of this decade. While Congress
adopted various open access provisions in the almost unanimously-approved Tele-
communications Act of 1996, the FCC decided to abandon this mode of regulation for
broadband in a series of decisions beginning in 2001 and 2002. Open access has been
largely treated as a closed issue in U.S. policy debates ever since.
Id.
12 See Benjamin Lennett, Dis-Empowering Users vs. Maintaining Internet Freedom:
Network Management and Quality of Service (QoS), 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 97, 146
(2009).
'3 Id. at 117.
14 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at 21; see also Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Broadband Performance 4 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, OBI Technical Paper No.
4, 2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-broadband-
initiative-%28obi%29-technical-paper-broadband-performance.pdf.
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visions should be implemented to prevent the feudalization of the Internet.
Part 1I introduces the concept of feudalization-the structural transforma-
tions through which public space becomes controlled by private interests-and
how the OSI stack can be used to understand the hierarchical dependencies of
networked technology. Part III explores policy enabled enclosure at different
layers of the OSI stacks and illustrates how control of any one layer can be
leveraged to enclose other layers and the Internet. Part IV makes the case for
open technologies in light of the implications created by closed technologies at
different layers of the Internet. Having established the potential for open tech-
nologies to preserve the Internet as a commons, in Part V we offer policy solu-
tions to the various examples of enclosures in Part III. Part VI concludes with
the case for a new policy paradigm that recognizes the need to address issue
across the technological stack in order to protect the democratic potential of
the Internet.
II. THE FEUDALIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE AND THE ART OF
ENCLOSURE
The popular metaphor of the Internet as a public sphere often overlooks the
darker side of this formulation. In discussing the structural transformations of
the public sphere, Jilrgen Habermas clarified that while the market helped cre-
ate the initial space for civic engagement, it also constantly threatened to colo-
nize public spheres through privatization." He referred to this phenomenon as
the "re-feudalization of the public sphere," a process in which the newly cre-
ated public space would succumb to commercial pressures and reorganize
along familiar power hierarchies." In recent years, Habermas has increasingly
underscored the risk of market colonization, decrying the tendency toward
treating the public sphere as merely another location for commercial relations
to take hold."
A similar phenomenon, by analogy, is "enclosure," a process by which pri-
vate interests overtake common or public lands for the purpose of exploiting
the lands to the exclusion of others." In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Eng-
" See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE (TRANS. T. BURGER) (MIT Press 1989).
16 Id.
'7 Joirgen Habermas, Political Communication in Media Society - Does Democracy Still
Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,
16 COMM. THEORY 411, 412 (2006).
I8 See James Boyle, Enclosure and the Disappearance of the Public Domain, 131
DAEDALUS 2, 13-17 (2002) (analyzing the English enclosure movement's economic princi-
ples and how they can be used to explain the modem era's DMCA and other electronic data
regimes).
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lish countryside witnessed a sudden privatization of land that had long been
treated as a commons. This change in the legal standing of the land criminal-
ized a range of behavior that had previously been accepted as cultural norms,
such as maintaining livestock and harvesting food or gleaning on common
lands." With the advent of poor laws, these behaviors were suddenly re-
categorized as poaching. Similarly, in the online context, enclosure systemati-
cally removes resources out of the public sphere and replaces a general notion
of maximizing the public good with a logic of profit maximization, thus ex-
cluding the majority of people and furthering the profits of a minority.
Debates over digital commons often assume a false dichotomy by treating
digital goods as traditional commodities. Most commodities are rivalrous-
their use by one entity excludes their use by another. For example, if one con-
sumes a fish, then that fish is not available to anyone else: there is a natural
rivalry among consumers for access to these goods. Likewise, most rivalrous
goods are excludable-one can prevent other consumers from eating the fish
by charging a price for it (thus laying the foundation for the traditional "Eco-
nomics 101" assumption that pricing will seek equilibrium between supply and
demand). Another foundational pillar of this traditional thinking is that non-
rivalrous goods are also non-excludable; that it is impossible to stop an indi-
vidual from utilizing this resource (e.g., daylight, air, learning). In addition,
rivalrous, yet non-excludable goods have given rise both to the "commons"
and the dystopian "tragedy of the commons," exemplified by problems like
overfishing, overgrazing, and pollution of the environment.
Excludable Non-Excludable
Rivalrous Private Goods Common Goods
Non-rivalrous Public Goods
What is at stake in this increasingly feudalized space is a shifting concept of
ownership. What happens when public goods and common goods are re-
envisioned as private goods? And how do regulatory processes and technologi-
cal innovations spur these shifts? The "digital commons" metaphor may serve
as a poignant reminder that the Internet's unique power has rested largely on
its openness, on the fact that it is our most public media, and that it was created
as a result of public support through DARPA and other tax-supported entities,
19 DAN SCHILLER, DIGITAL CAPITALISM: NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARKET SYSTEM 77
(MIT Press 1999).
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but it oversimplifies the multi-layered nature of the technology and the poten-
tial for enclosures to manifest themselves in seemingly innocuous ways. Built
using a "dumb" infrastructure,20 the Internet has been defined by protocols that
transfer data packets on a "first-in first-out," best-effort basis. The success of
the Internet has been defined by the range of uses and application freedoms
facilitated by its openness. Under this framework, application usage by two
users with access to bandwidth (such as neighbors both subscribing to 5 Mbps
connections), or two viewers watching the same online video, is defacto non-
rivalrous. However, as the fundamental structures of the Internet undergo
transformation, its non-rivalrous nature is quickly being supplanted by the
same forces that drove wedges and created power pyramids in the English
countryside in the 14 Century. The freedom to define the Internet to the needs
of the user, to share video, and to choose the appropriate method of communi-
cation over TCP/IP is quickly becoming enclosed.
A. Critiquing the Internet
An expanding corpus of research describes areas where corporate en-
croachment is already occurring. One of the best known examples is renounced
scholar Lawrence Lessig's distinction between read-only culture and rewri-
table culture, where he notes that creativity is sacrificed for private profits as
an intellectual policy regime runs amok.2 Economist Michael Perelman makes
a similar argument that the public domain's digital commons are undergoing a
kind of enclosure and becoming increasingly impoverished by a proprietary
mentality.22
Other scholars highlight the Internet's transformation at the network opera-
tion and content layers." In The Future of Ideas, Lessig listed the threats gate-
keeping Internet service providers (ISPs) pose for the Internet.24 One recent
article by Bart Cammaerts categorized these criticisms as falling along struc-
20 See David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network,
http://www.hyperorg.com/misc/stupidnet.html (last visited May 14, 2011) (explaining how
the "stupid network" consists of a "dumb transport in the middle, and intelligent user-
controlled endpoints" as well as a design "guided by plenty, not scarcity").
21 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (Penguin Books 2004).
22 MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATIVITY (Palgrave 2002).
23 See MARTIN FRANSMAN, THE NEW ICT ECOSYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 52-54
(Kokoro 2007); JONATHAN ZirrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 67-
69 (Yale Univ. Press 2008); WU, supra note 3, at 289-290; VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 1, at
84-88.
24 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (Vintage Books 2002).
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tural or individual levels.25 This analysis focuses on enclosure tactics that are
more structural in nature (as opposed to the ways in which content providers
have become increasingly commercial in recent years). Though some attempts
have been directed toward these areas, relatively few efforts have tried to sys-
tematically model the various critiques or try to connect them to larger sys-
temic analyses. While many of these critiques deal with the oft-mentioned
"digital divide" and focus on issues related to access, other critiques emphasize
deeper systemic issues.
Dan Schiller leveled one of the first critiques aimed at delineating the neo-
liberal shift in market expansion and political economic transition encompass-
ing the Internet, which he called "Digital Capitalism."26 Schiller noted that
Internet networks increasingly serve the aims of transnational corporations via
strict privatization of content and unregulated transborder data flow allowing
content owned within one region to enter new markets.27 Likewise, he advo-
cates for the creation of a "communications commons," and efforts towards the
"financing of a multiplicity of decentralized but collectively or cooperatively
operated media outlets, licensed on the basis of commitment to encouraging
participatory involvement in all levels of their activity" to "more fully [release]
the democratic and participatory potential of digital technologies."28 These
critical trends presaged a growing body of work that addresses normative con-
cerns like open architecture, open access, and online ethics. For example, Pro-
fessor Yochai Benkler's Wealth of Networks advocates for a commons based
policy orientation. This approach is aligned with the notion of Cooper's "open
architecture."29 Frequently referred to as a commons-based approach to the
management of communications systems, this model emphasizes cooperation
and innovation as opposed to privatization and enclosure.
More recently, Jonathan Zittrain has intervened in these debates to argue
that the U.S. is allowing the Internet conform to connect appliances rather than
25 Bart Cammaerts, Critiques on the Participatory Potentials of Web 2.0,
COMMUNICATION, CULTURE & CRITIQUE 358, 336-362 (2008), available at
http://eprints.Ise.ac.uk/23770/1/Critiqueson-the-participatory-potentials-of Web2.0%2
8LSERO%29.pdf.
26 SCHILLER, supra note 19, 204-207.
27 Id. at xvi.
28 Id. at 204-205.
29 Mark Cooper, Making the Network Connection, Using Network Theory To Explain
The Link Between Open Digital Platforms And Innovation, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE AS
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY STANFORD LAW SCHOOL 126
(Mark Cooper ed., 2004), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/openarchitecture.pdf. Cooper writes: "The Internet
is a "stack" of protocols whose architecture is open. In other words, the digital communica-
tions platform is a nested set of open components that exhibit an unprecedented level of
connectivity. It exhibits the modular, hierarchical, distributed, multiscale connectivity of an
ultrarobust network."
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produce generative technology. 30 Zittrain sees the development of the Internet
as a history of lost opportunity. To underscore this shift, he uses a three part
layered model that distinguishes between physical, protocol and application
layers. He also allows for content and social layers above these three." Al-
though this model is useful for highlighting areas of enclosure-and provides
yet another typology for understanding different theories of technology-we
prefer an adaptation of an older schematic that has been utilized as both the
foundation of the Internet and has the advantage of highlighting certain aspects
of the Internet that other models fail to capture: the OSI model.
B. The OSI Model
Developed by the International Standardization Organization, the seven-
layer OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model breaks communications net-
work into different layers, with each layer representing different core functions
of the network.3 2 A hierarchical architecture, the range of function of different
layers of the stack is maximized by the openness of the surrounding layers.
The OSI model serves as a convenient framework for illustrating various
threats to Internet. Although digital feudalism is not limited to the threats at the
OSI layers-and although the OSI model is not a strict cross section of the
Internet-the model is a useful heuristic for documenting encroachments at
individual layers. Most importantly, the OSI model helps illustrate how suffi-
cient control at a single layer can enclose the Internet commons and limit end-
user freedoms.
30 See ZIrrRAIN, supra note 23, at 2-4. For example, Zittrain draws a distinction be-
tween the early Apple II and modem iPhone systems, noting that the Apple II was "genera-
tive technology" where Apple did not specify a specific use for the platform.
3' See ZITrRAIN, supra note 23, 67-68.
32 See X.200 : Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Refer-
ence Model: The basic model, INT'L TELECOMS UNION, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-
X.200/en/.
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Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference ModelL
OSI Model
Data unit Layer
Data 7. Application
6. Presentation
5. Session
Segment 4. Transport
Packet 3. Network
Frame 2. Data Link
Bit 1. Physical
Function
Network process to application
Data representation and encryption
Interhost communication
End-to-end connections and
reliability
Path determination and logical
addressing
Physical addressing (MAC & LLC)
Media, signal and binary
transmission
III. ENCLOSURES ALONG OSI DIMENSIONS
A. Physical Layer Problems
The physical layer is the foundational layer of networks. The transport me-
diums that comprise the physical layer-copper and fiber, switches, routers,
and slices of radio spectrum-can be open or closed. Regulatory and legal in-
tervention plays an important role in defining the limits at the physical layer,
and in turn, what methods and technologies can be used to communicate
through on the network.
For example, without the advent of the FCC's landmark Carterfone decision
3 OSI Model, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI model (last visited May 14,
2011); see PATRICK CICCARELLI & CHRISTINA FAULKNER, NETWORKING FOUNDATIONS 16-34
(2004).
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to allow interconnection of "foreign attachments" to the AT&T telephone net-
work, wireline communications may well have taken a different turn-even
preventing the emergence of the Internet in its present form. Prior to Carter-
fone, the FCC tariff governing interconnecting devices stated, "No equipment,
apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the telephone company shall be
attached to or connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone com-
pany, whether physically, by induction or otherwise."34 Even the Hush-a-
Phone, a plastic attachment that blocked room noise, was originally deemed
illegal to affix to telephone handsets.3
While AT&T may have wanted end-to-end control over every part of their
telephone network, the FCC wisely concluded that end-users should decide for
themselves which devices and technologies to attach to telephone lines. In do-
ing so, it created a legal precedent that facilitated the development of foreign
attachments,36 such as office telephone systems, answering machines, and-
most importantly-the computer modem. Unfortunately, next-generation net-
working systems may not be so lucky, as AT&T and other incumbents threaten
to recreate the pre-Carterfone conditions that existed over 40 years ago on to-
day's wireless networks.
1. Open Access & Common Carriage
In addition to the mandate to allow "foreign attachments" on the telephone
network, two key elements fueled the establishment and growth of the Internet:
open access and common carriage. Open access policies required "existing
carriers to lease access to their networks to their competitors, mostly at regu-
lated rates."" Open Access meant that anyone could create an Internet Service
Provider (ISP), and AT&T had to provide access to facilities and interconnec-
tion for these new rivals. In addition, because it was subject to common car-
riage requirements, AT&T had to provide connectivity over its own network
between end-users' computer modems and these new competitive ISPs. In
many regards, these key factors are what helped the Internet develop into "a
network of networks," as opposed to a singular system controlled by one en-
tity.
However, policies supported by incumbent network operators have system-
34 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Thomas F.
Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co., Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest (Defendants), Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 421
(June 26, 1968) [hereinafter Carterfone Decision].
3s See LESSIG, supra note 24, at 30.
36 Id. at 421.
3 BERMKAN REPORT, supra note II at 14.
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atically eroded these provisions. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 codi-
fied a binary classification of telecommunications services and information
services, subjecting the former to common carriage and unbundled access at
reasonable rates." However, this binary classification broke down as techno-
logical convergence offered the same service over previously distinctly differ-
ent legacy technologies, such as the telephone and cable television.3 9 Further,
the 1996 Act did not address IP-based voice services (e.g., VolP) as a tele-
communications or information service, .
Changes in the regulatory framework for broadband Internet service has
benefitted a handful of ISPs at the expense of the greater market. On June 27,
2005, the Supreme Court's Brand X decision upheld the authority of the FCC
to reclassify cable broadband service as an "information service."40 Because
they were not subject to common carriage provisions, cable ISPs were not re-
quired to offer access to third-party ISPs. Conversely, DSL incumbents , as a
telecommunications services, had to allow ISPs, including competing cable
providers, access to its own infrastructure. MCI argued that this provided an
unfair competitive advantage to the cable ISPs.4 1 Soon thereafter, the FCC
ruled that digital subscriber line (DSL) ISPs and others were no longer re-
quired to unbundle their services or sell network access to potential competi-
tors.42
Since these deregulatory decisions, broadband competition in the United
States has collapsed. According to the U.S. Census, nearly 50% of independent
ISPs went out of business between 2000 and 2005, during which time the
U.S.'s international broadband rankings plummeted.43 The National Broadband
38 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251 (c)(3) (2006).
39 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 25-26, 209-10 (2005) (dis-
cussing the obsolescence of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1996, because
its structure does not match the structure of services as they are delivered over the Internet
today).
40 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X), 545 U.S.
967, 968-969 (2005); see also In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regu-
latory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling & Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4841-42 (Mar. 14, 2002).
4' BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1000.
42 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access Over Wireline Facilities, Report
& Order & Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14866, 14904 (Aug. 5, 2005).
43 In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Business listed 9,335 ISPs in the
United States. See Number of Firms, Number of Establishments, Employment and Annual
Payroll by Employment Size of the Enterprise for the United States, All Industries 2000,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2000/us 6digitnaics_2000.xls). By 2005 the num-
ber of ISPS was 4,417. See Number of Firms, Number of Establishments, Employment and
Annual Payroll by Employment Size of the Enterprise for the United States, All Industries
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Plan, released in March 2010, indicated that only 4% of Americans have a
choice of more than two wireline Internet service providers." The lack of com-
petition in the market contributes to both the slow speeds and high costs of
wireline connectivity in the United States. Unfortunately, when it comes to
wireless communications, the prognosis may be even worse.
2. Spectrum Resources
Spectrum capacity is essential for wireless networks, but current licensing
and distribution schemes are archaic and hyper-inefficient. Current spectrum
allocation models assume that single entities require absolute control over their
spectrum band at all times, resulting in gross inefficiencies of spectrum alloca-
tion.45
Between January 2004 and August 2005, the National Science Foundation
commissioned six reports from Shared Spectrum 46 looking at actual spectrum
use in six cities across the United States-their results showed that the amount
of spectrum actually being used as pitifully low 47:
2005, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2005/us_6digitnaics 2005.xls.
44 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at 37.
45 See Pickard & Meinrath, supra note 17.
46 All six spectrum usage reports are available at SSC, SHARED SPECTRUM,
http://www.sharedspectrum.com/papers/spectrum-reports/ (last visited May 14, 2011) [here-
inafter Spectrum Usage Reports].
47 See MARK A. HENRY, ET AL., SHARED SPECTRUM COMPANY, SPECTRUM OCCUPANCY
MEASUREMENTS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 48 (2005), available at
http://www.sharedspectrum.com/wp-content/uploads/NSFChicago_2005-
I l measurements_v I 2.pdf.
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The overall results of this analysis was of the sites surveyed, spectrum occu-
pancy was highest in Chicago, Illinois, with 17.4% of the frequencies in use,
and that the average utilization rate was 5.2%. In their most recent study of
spectral efficiency in 2007, they conducted measurements in Limestone,
Maine, and found a usage rating of 1.7%.49 Furthermore, today, over 95 per-
cent of the public airwaves (under 30 GHz) are either reserved for governmen-
tal use or licensed to private parties.5 o Given these real-world measurements, it
is shocking that there are so few opportunities to access the public airwaves,
especially when access to clearly underutilized spectrum would assist in the
development of innovative new technologies that benefit the public and expand
communication opportunities.
48 Id. at 48-49, 53.
49 TUGBA ERPEK, MARK LOFQUIST & KEN PATTON, SHARED SPECTRUM COMPANY,
SPECTRUM OCCUPANCY MEASUREMENTS LORING COMMERCE CENTRE LIMESTONE MAINE 37
(2007), available at http://www.sharedspectrum.com/wp-
content/uploads/LoringSpectrum OccupancyMeasurements v2_3.pdf.
so In cases like the citizens' band (CB) spectrum is set aside for amateur use, or accord-
ing to "Part 15" rules which allow some public wireless devices such as garage door openers
and microwave ovens to operate in unlicensed spectrum. See BENNETr Z. KOBB, WIRELESS
SPECTRUM FINDER: TELECOMMUNICATIONS, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENTIFIC RADIO
FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS IN THE US 30 MHz-300 GHz (McGraw-Hill 2001), and NAT'L
TELECOMM AND INFO. ADMIN., MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL
RADIO FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT (REDBOOK) (US Gov't Printing Office, 2008).
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Spectrum allocation and frequency assignments largely ignore today's tech-
nical realities and gross inefficiencies of spectrum usage currently exist. The
current spectrum allocation regime ignores technologies such as cognitive ra-
dios, which adapt to available space in real-time in order to permit concomitant
use of spectrum by unlicensed and licensed users." Instead, the FCC and
NTIA licensing model is predicated on use of the public airwaves dating back
to the World War I era that is "woefully outdated given current technologies
and spectrum needs."52 This "command and control" approach to spectrum
management allows only a single entity to broadcast on a given frequency,
often at a specific power level and geographic location." Tim Wu has likened
these command and control policies to "Soviet Style Rules . . . dating from the
1920s."54 Wu estimates that "[a]t any given moment, more than 90 percent of
the nation's airwaves are empty,"" and other analysts have referred to current
spectrum management policy as a "paradigm for economic inefficiency."5
This licensing scheme benefits the holders of exclusive licenses. Incumbent
interests already invested in licensed frequencies seek to prevent competition
by maintaining the antiquated regulatory status quo.57 In this way, incumbents
dramatically slow down change or stop it altogether. "Among neutral observ-
ers," Nuechterlein & Weiser note, "there is little dispute that . . . the current
spectrum regime requires a comprehensive overhaul."" In other words, from a
digital feudalism perspective, those who have control over the physical layer of
the OSI model can impede competitors, lock customers into expensive service
tiers, and inhibit innovation.
B. Data Link and Network Layer Problems
The second OSI layer, the data link layer, creates the foundation for TCP/IP
transmission, creating the framework for additional protocols, like UDP, to
communicate by transferring data between different network components."
s' Sascha Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunis-
tic Unlicensed Reuse of Government Spectrum, 24 INT'L J. OF COMMC'NS L. & POL'Y 1067
(2009)
52 Id
5 Id.
54 Tim Wu, Op-Ed., OPEC 2.0, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, § A, at 17.
55 Id.
56 DALE HATFIELD & PHIL WESIER, CATO INST., TOWARD PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SPECTRUM: THE DIFFICULT POLICY CHOICES AHEAD 4 (2006).
57 Sascha Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunis-
tic Unlicensed Reuse of Government Spectrum, 24 INT'L J. OF COMMC'Ns L. & POL'Y 1067
(2009)
18 NUECHERTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 39, at 239.
59 ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 8 (2000).
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Enclosures at the data link layer can make communication inoperable by "leap-
frogging" into the functionality of other layers, differentiating between types of
communication, and creating virtual circuits that can control or break end-to-
end functionality. The third layer of the OSI model is the network layer and
enables full network communication. In the TCP/IP framework of the Internet,
the Internet Protocol comprises the network layer and provides the foundation
for most end-to-end communications by bridging node-to-node communication
of the data link layer and helping to maintain the quality of service requests of
the transport layer.co
1. Internet Protocol Addresses
Internet Protocol is central to connecting devices over their physical net-
works and requires addresses to identify different devices like. Much like a
telephone number rings a specific device or address, Internet protocol ad-
dresses routes data to specific destinations on a network or across networks.
There current dilemma is between two versions of the IP protocol: IPv4 and
IPv6. Introduced in 1981, IPv4 uses a 32-bit address space and can support a
maximum of 4.3 billion addresses (2 32) 2 a number once thought to be suffi-
cient to support future devices. However, just ten years after its introduction,
fears soon mounted about "address space exhaustion," or usage of all 4.3 bil-
lion addresses. These fears have come to fruition. While all IPv4 addresses
have not been distributed, the IPv4 address space has been exhausted. 3 While
work-arounds like network address translation ("NAT") help slow the rate of
exhaustion, it will become increasingly difficult to add publicly addressable
devices, websites, and destinations as the last IPv4 addresses are distributed.'
Version six of the IP protocol was developed to address this problem." IPv6
contains 2128 addresses (about 3.4x 1038).66 That number will sufficiently pro-
vide enough IP addresses to assign one to every atom on the surface of the
Earth (and then do the same for 100 more Earths). 7 It is also enough to give
60 Id.
61 Id. at 10.
62 LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 2 (MIT Press 2009) [hereinafter PROTOCOL POLITICS].
63 See Iljitsch van Beijnum, River ofIPv4 Addresses Officially Runs Dry, ARS TECHNICA
(Feb. 3, 2011, 9:15AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/river-of-ipv4-
addresses-officially-runs-dry.ars.
6 PROTOCOL POLITICS, supra note 62, at 156.
65 See Iljitsch van Beijnum, Everything You Need to Know About IPv6, ARs TECHNICA
(Mar. 7, 2007, 9:10PM), http://arstechnica.com/hardware/news/2007/03/IPv6.ars
66 Id.
67 See Posting of Ivy Wigmore to IT Knowledge Exchange,
http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/whatis/ipv6_addresshowmany-is-that-in-
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each of the 6.9 billion people alive today more IPs than ever existed in the en-
tirety of IPv4 and still have hundred upon hundreds upon hundreds of billions
of IPs left over.
Globally, IP address allocation has been primarily Americentric. In 2009 it
was estimated North America currently had 32% of IPv4 addresses,"8 and at
one point, Stanford University had more address allocations than China."9 A
similar trend may emerge for IPv6 distribution-73% of recent address alloca-
tions went to Europe and North America, compared to the 63% of IPv4 ad-
dresses allocated to the two continents as of 2009 despite only representing
1/5 of the world's population and allocating a disproportionately small alloca-
tion to the fastest growing regions." One would expect that, with a de facto
unlimited supply, IPv6 addresses should cost next to nothing. Instead, a nearly
identical pricing regime for IPv4 address space has been carried over into IPv6
address space 71-creating a potential cost barrier to smaller networks or devel-
oping countries for a plentiful commodity. A quick review of the American
Registry for Internet Numbers demonstrates that the fee schedule for IPv4 and
IPv6 begins at a cost of $1250/year for a "X-small" allocation to $18,000/year
for an "X-large" allocation:72
IPv4 ISP Annual Fees
Size Category Fee (US Dollars) Block Size
X-small $1,250 smaller than /20
Small $2,250 /20 to /19
Medium $4,500 larger than /19,
up to and including /16
Large $9,000 larger than /16,
up to and including /14
X-large $18,000 larger than /14
numbers/ (Jan. 14, 2009, 7:26 AM).
68 PROTOCOL POLITICS, supra note 62, at 173.
69 Id. at 155.
70 Id. at 173.
n1 See Fee Schedule, AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS,
http://www.arin.net/fees/fee schedule.html (last visited May 14, 2011). Though it should be
noted that one does receive substantially more IPv6 IP addresses for the same price vis-a-vis
IPv4 IP addresses, the main barrier for many new entrants and is often the cost, not the
number of IP addresses.
72 Id. For an descriptions of IP block size, see Understanding IP Addressing, Ripe
NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE, http://www.ripe.net/intemet-coordination/press-
centre/understanding-ip-addressing (last visited May 14, 2011).
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IPv6 Annual FeesL
Size Category Fee (US Dollars) Block Size
X-small $1,250 smaller than /40
Small $2,250 /40 to /32
Medium $4,500 /31 to /30
Large $9,000 /29 to /27
X-large $18,000 /26 to /22
XX-large $36,000 /22 and larger
In the United States, the lack of national policy for transitioning to IPv6 cre-
ates uncertainty about how the distribution of remaining IPv4 addresses will
take place.74 IPv4 exhaustion may be creating a grey market for these increas-
ingly valuable addresses, which will inevitably lead to a digital divide between
those who can afford the addresses and those who cannot.
Furthermore, because IPv6 and IPv4 cannot communicate directly with one-
another, networks on legacy IPv4 networks will have to use IPv4 to IPv6 trans-
lation techniques to enable them to connect to IPv6-enabled providers." Like-
wise, early adopters of IPv6 may find themselves having problems if their up-
stream provider is still using IPv4.n Finally, users of IPv4-only networks may
find themselves unable to reach IPv6 destinations, further exacerbating the
digital divide. In essence, IP addresses become another way that dominant
market players-those with control over key assets-can leverage control over
higher layers of the OSI stack.
73 To incentivize adoption of IPv6, the American Registry for Internet Numbers insti-
tuted fee waivers that pay for a diminishing amount of these fees year to year and phase out
entirely in 2012. Id.
74 While the Office of Management and Budget has pushed for federal networks to tran-
sition to IPv6, there has not been a domestic IPv6 policy. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET
(OMB), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-05-22, TRANSITION PLANNING FOR INTERNET
PROTOCOL VERSION 6 (IPv6) (2005) (describing the OMB's transition attempts).
75 Mel Beckman, Beware the black market rising for IP addresses, INFOWORLD (May 3,
2010), http://www.infoworld.com/d/networking/beware-the-black-market-rising-ip-
addresses-729.
76 See van Beijnum, supra note 65 ("Although designing a new protocol isn't exactly
trivial, the hard part is getting it deployed. Having to put an entire new infrastructure in
place or flipping a switch from "IPv4" to "IPv6" for the current Internet aren't feasible. To
avoid these issues as much as possible, the IETF came up with a number of transition tech-
niques.").
n7 See Iljitsch van Beijnum, River oflPv4 Addresses Officially Runs Dry, ARS TECHNICA
(Feb. 3, 2011 9:15AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/river-of-ipv4-
addresses-officially-runs-dry.ars.
7 See IPv4 Deployment Frequently Asked Questions, RIPE.NET,
http://www.ripe.net/info/faq/IPv6-deployment.html (last visited May 14, 2011).
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IP addresses can also be used to disrupt communications by enabling net-
work administrators to censor particular content, specific users, or even entire
regions of the Internet. IP addresses can be blocked individually or as blocks
by a variety of entities-for example, schools or businesses can block access to
certain Web sites or Web sites can block user access to content. Although IP
address blocking can be used beneficially-such as to block spam-" the same
means can also improperly inhibit legitimate communications. ISP blocking of
IP addresses remains one of the greatest challenges.
Effects on users can be unintentional. For example, on December 22, 2004,
Verizon started blocking e-mail sourced from IP addresses that originated from
European ISPs.so Though it intended to identify and block spam, many of the
blocked IP addresses were not sources of spam. Although the embargo was
later identified to be a result of over-vigilant spam filters, the damage to com-
munication was evident to users, resulting in a class action suit."' Verizon is
not the only ISP to encounter problems in differentiating spam mail from le-
gitimate mail. Two years earlier in October 2002, a similarly overly sensitive
spam filter blocked a week's worth of incoming email for Earthlink subscrib-
ers. 82
IP addresses can also be used to block access to certain websites by an ISP,
or by a website to block access to certain users. In July 2009, AT&T blocked
the imageboard website 4Chan, preventing any user on AT&Ts network from
accessing the website." Similarly, Wikipedia sometimes block users from edit-
ing its content,8 4 and Ticketmaster uses IP addresses to identify and block bulk
purchasing of tickets.8 ' Left unchecked, IP blocking can have profound im-
7 ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: How CONTROL ExisTs AFTER
DECENTRALIZATION 119 (MIT Press 2004).
80 John Gartner, Verizon E-mail Embargo Enrages, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/01/66226.
81 Nate Anderson, Verizon proposes settlement for class action lawsuit, ARs TECHNICA
(Apr. 5,2010, 11:10AM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/04/6525.ars.
82 Michelle Delio, When Everything Was Spam to ISP, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2002)
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2002/11/56235.
83 Jacqui Cheng, AT&T: 4chan block due to DDoS attack coming from 4chan IPs, ARS
TECHNICA (July 27, 2009, 12:47 PM), http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/07/att-
4chan-block-due-to-ddos-attack-coming-from-4chan-ips.ars.
84 See Wikipedia Blocking Policy, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedialorg/wiki/Blocking_policy (last visited May 14, 2011); see also Melissa
McNamara, Stephen Colbert Sparks Wiki War, CBS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/08/blogophile/mainl 873436.shtml (reporting on
when Wikipedia administrators blocked television personality Stephen Colbert and his fans
from editing articles about elephants). See also Ryan Singel, Wikipedia Bans Church of
Scientology, WIRED (May 29, 2009, 2:18 PM),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/wikipedia-bans-church-of-scientology/.
85 Kim Zetter, Wiseguys Indicted in $25 Million Online Ticket Ring, WIRED (Mar. I,
2010, 12:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/tag/wiseguys/.
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pacts on the ability to communicate freely.
2. IP Multimedia Subsystem ("IMS")
IMS is a still-evolving feature set for architecting wireline and wireless net-
works that has great potential to enclose portions of the next generation com-
munications systems. Telecommunications firms have been particularly fo-
cused on deploying IMS in their wireless networks." The Internet is a packet-
switched network-information is broken into packets on one end and can tra-
vel independently over multiple pathways to be reassembled on the receiving
end." However, IMS can make communication resemble more of a circuit-
switched network." Like the days of copper-wire telephone, IMS allows a car-
rier to earmark specific channels for specific communications, thus creating the
ability for bill differentiation among data types that are actually traversing the
same network architecture. In other words, Internet traditionally had an appli-
cation agnostic approach, allowing allow a user to send e-mail, use Skype, surf
the web, and IM with friends for a single fee, wireless networks employ IMS
to differentiate these services.
The low barriers to entry of the open Internet allows developers to innovate
and create new ways to use bandwidth resources. However, quality of service
implementations like IMS predefine the value of certain uses of network
bandwidth and freeze prioritization for certain services and applications." The
existing application differentiated charges on cellular phone networks suggest
a nefarious pricing regime: while residential broadband connectivity costs
$0.01 per megabyte regardless of use, wireless voice costs $1.00 per megabyte
of bandwidth, and text messages are extraordinarily priced at over $1,000 per
megabyte."o
IMS can allow this pricing regime to continue even though changes should
86 See Rich Karpinski, Services, LET Help Renew IMS Push, CONNECTED PLANET (Sept.
24, 2009), http://connectedplanetonline.com/servicedelivery/news/services-Ite-help-ims-
push-0924/.
87 See ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 14-17 (2000)
(describing the Internet Protocol).
88 John G. Waclawsky, IMS: A Critique of the Grand Plan, 35 Bus. COMMC'NS REV.
54, 55 (Oct. 2005).
89 M. CHRIS RILEY & ROBB TOPOLSKI, FREE PRESS & NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
POLICY BRIEF THE HIDDEN HARMS OF APPLICATION BIAS 6 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the hiddenharms_ofapplication bias.
90 See Andrew Odylzko Network neutrality, search neutrality, and the never-ending
conflict between efficiency and fairness in markets 4-5 (Digital Tech. Center, Univ. of
Minn., Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/net.neutrality.pdf;
see also Andrew Odylzko, Pricing and Architecture of the Internet: Historical Perspectives
from Telecommunications and Transportation 4, (Digital Tech. Center, Univ. of Minn.,
Aug. 2004), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/pricing.architecture.pdf.
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allow greater end-user flexibility. While 3G cellular networks have separate
channels for different types of network access to allow prioritization of voice
and differentiated billing," 4G networks are based on IP, allowing for end-to-
end communication.92 Eventually, voice will be operated using solely VolP,
creating the flattened network dynamics seen in wireline connectivity. In the
name of managing scarce spectrum resources, wireless providers choose to
exert centralized control over an end-to-end network, instead of upgrading
their networks with additional capacity-a process that would make these pri-
oritizations irrelevant and greatly benefit consumers. IMS will allow carriers to
charge users multiple times by differentiating uses over the same network-
once for a voice plan, a second time to surf the web or send e-mail, and a third
time to send text messages to friends. As John Waclowski writes, "[w]ith IMS,
you will never know if you are getting the advertised broadband capacity you
think you are paying for. The actual bit rate will be a function of what IMS
thinks you are doing.""
3. Media Access Controller
Every network interface controller such as wireless cards and Ethernet
cards, has a unique identifier built into the device called a Media Access Con-
troller ("MAC") address. MAC addresses, which are more static than IP ad-
dresses, are often used to identify devices on a network.94
Since they are unique identifiers, MAC addresses can be used by security
systems (such as those built in to Wi-Fi routers) to deny access to a network. 9
For example, a user who purchases Internet connectivity in a hotel room on a
laptop would not be able to transfer connectivity to a smart phone or tablet; the
user would have to repurchase connectivity for each additional device. MAC
addresses enable restrictive pricing schemes that create more opportunities to
charge consumers for connectivity.
Network operators have experimented with exploitative pricing in the resi-
dential wireline connectivity realm, as well. ISPs have attempted to control the
number of devices their users could connect to their network-much in the
91 Gilles Bertrand, The IP Multimedia Subsystem in Next Generation Networks, 2 (May
30, 2007), http://www.rennes.enst-bretagne.fr/-gbertran/files/IMS anoverview.pdf.
92 Jose Vilches, Everything You Need to Know About 4G Wireless Technology,
TECHSPOT (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.techspot.com/guides/272-everything-about-4g/ ("Be-
sides speed, several other guidelines have been traced for wireless communication standards
to qualify as 4G. In a nutshell, they should.. .be based on an all-IP packet switched net-
work.").
9 See Waclawsky, supra note 88, at 55.
94 NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 574 (23d ed. 2007).
9 Tip: Enable and Configure MAC Address Filtering, TECHNET MAGAZINE,
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ff521761.aspx (last visited May 14, 2011).
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same way that AT&T did prior to the Carterfone decision- 96 by locking in a
specific MAC address as the only authorized device allowed on the home con-
nection.97 This lead to the widespread use of "MAC spoofing"-a process
whereby one can manually change the MAC address of one device to emulate
another device's MAC address." In the hotel example, a user who changes the
MAC address of their second device to mirror the MAC address of the author-
ized would be able to connect additional devices to the network using the same
account. Home users could spoof the MAC address of the computer that was
registered with their ISP, enabling them to route around the barriers created by
service providers to connect multiple devices through the router to their Inter-
net uplink.
4. IMEI
Much like MAC addresses, cell phones also have unique identifiers embed-
ded in their firmware. Each Subscriber Identity Module ("SIM") card has an
International Mobile Equipment Identity ("IMEI") number. The IMEI authen-
ticates a cellular device with a network and allows the device to communi-
cate.' IMEls can also function as tracking identifiers-a major concern for
privacy. Mobile devices broadcast IMEls to authenticate a device when con-
necting to a cell tower."o IMEls expand the scope of who is able to track users
beyond law enforcement officials and network operators. In fact, some stores
have used cell signals to track a shopper's movement and patterns, enabling
them to gather valuable information, such as which aisles they visited and how
much time is spent in front of a display.'O1 These types of surveillance are au-
tomatic, and make it difficult for users to know when they are being monitored
or to know how to opt out. More recently, a German elected official sued for
data retained by his cell phone carrier and found that Deutsche Telekom had
96 Carterfone Decision, supra note 34, at 421 ("[AT&T] advised their subscribers that
the Carterfone, when used in conjunction with the subscriber's telephone, is a prohibited
interconnecting device").
97 No Internet with New Router, Computer, or Adapter: MAC Spoofing, NETGEAR (Mar.
18, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://kb.netgear.com/app/answers/detail/aid/1086/~/no-intemet-with-
new-router,-computer,-or-adapte&/o3A-mac-spoofing.
98 Chad Perrin, How to Spoof a MAC Address, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 22, 2008, 1:28 PM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/how-to-spoof-a-mac-address/395.
99 NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 482 (23d ed. 2007).
100 CHEN Hui ONG NELLY KASIM, SAJINDRA JAYASENA, LARRY RUDOLPH, TAT JEN CHAM,
PROACTIVE DETECTION AND RECOVERY OF LOST MOBILE PHONES (2004), available at
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/7432/CS022.pdfrsequence=1.
101 Jonathan Richards, Shops track customers via mobile phone: Signals given off by
phones allow shopping centres to monitor how long people stay and which stores they visit,
THE TIMES (May 16, 2008),
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/techand-web/article3945496.ece.
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"recorded and saved his longitude and latitude coordinates more than 35,000
times."o 2 Over time, these invasive actions can allow companies to build up
remarkably detailed and valuable profiles of cell phone users. It is not far-
fetched to imagine that sometime in the near future, these companies could
partner with third parties to target advertisements directly to one's front door.
Access to information private user data such tracking a mobile user's location
not only raises privacy concerns but also represents a case of a carrier or other
entity harvesting user data without the user consent or knowledge and gaining
value from a customer beyond the transparent transaction of purchasing a
communication's service.
5. Copyright Enforcement vs. Fair Use
Many efforts to stem the transfer of copyrighted material online take advan-
tage of certain facets of the OSI model. Some countries have proposed or
passed laws to terminate the Internet connection to a household if a user of that
household's Internet connection transfers copyrighted material three times.
France's legislation, in particular, has been on the forefront of blocking Inter-
net access over copyright violations. Originally proposed in March of 2009, the
law "Cr6ation et Internet" creates a new group, HADOPI, "0 to compile and
maintain a blacklist of accused households. After a third accusation of infring-
ing on copyright, a household is blacklisted and cut off from Internet access
from any ISP for three months to a year.'" After failing to gain support, a re-
vised version of the bill was passed in September 2009, holding users respon-
sible for any use on their network.' 5 Ireland has followed with similar legisla-
102 Noem Cohen, It's Tracking Your Every Move and You May Not Even Know, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at Al.
103 HADOPI is the French agency charged with overseeing intellectual property. See
Hadopi - haute Autorite pour la diffusion des oeuvres et la protections des droits sur inter-
net, HADOPI, http://www.hadopi.fr.
104 Nate Anderson, French anti-P2P Law Toughest in the World, ARs TECHINICA (Mar.
10, 2009, 11:25 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/03/french-anti-p2p-law-
toughest-in-the-world.ars. See also Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et
la protection de la creation sur internet [Law 2009-669] of June 12, 2009 Promoting Dis-
semination and Protection of Creation on the Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 12, 2009, Article L 331-
29, as amended by CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL [CC] CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] decision No.
2009-590DC. Oct. 22, 2009, 19292.
105 Nate Anderson, France Passes Harsh Anti-P2P Three-Strikes Law (Again), ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 15, 2009, 3:59 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/09/france-passes-harsh-anti-p2p-three-strikes-law-again.ars. See also Loi
2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la creation sur internet
[Law 2009-669] of June 12, 2009 Promoting Dissemination and Protection of Creation on
the Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], June 12, 2009, Article L 331-29, as amended by CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL [CC]
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tion.o' Only after vociferous objection was language recommending that all
countries follow suit removed from the draft release of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement released in April 2010."'o
These legislative efforts shift considerable burden of proof to users rather
than accusers. Violations of copyright can easily be unintentional, and con-
sumers often do not fully understand convoluted intellectual property laws.
Indeed, professionals apparently have difficulty as well. For example, like
most government agencies HADOPI, the French agency charged with oversee-
ing intellectual property created an emblem for the organization. However, in
January 2010 a designer discovered that HADOPI, had violated copyright law
by using a their font without permission."o' The copyright infringement was
later attributed to an unwitting mistake by an employee. As with many laws
passed by legislators who do not understand the technologies involved, the
actual detection mechanisms that underlie enforcement of these laws are left
undefined. Such detection methods would almost certainly require some form
of deep packet inspection, which is the technological equivalent within a pack-
et-switched network to a wire tap on a circuit-based telephone system. The
implementation of effective law enforcement mechanisms would require an
invasive surveillance regime that would look at which devices are accessing
specific materials and what the actual payload of individual packets contains.
Privacy issues aside, such an enforcement mechanism can become quite prob-
lematic.
6. Tampering and Forging of Packets
The fact that the Internet is designed to be decentralized does not free it
from direct manipulation. Analysis and control of substantive information
flowing across networks is possible through a technique called deep packet
inspection ("DPI"). In contrast to circuit-switched networks that have dedi-
cated circuits, packet switched networks utilize discrete packets of information
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] decision No. 2009-590DC. Oct. 22, 2009, 19292.
106 Nate Anderson, Major Labels Go Bragh? Irish Judge Allows 3 Strikes, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 19, 2010, 12:21 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/04/major-labels-go-bragh-as-irish-judge-allows-3-
strikes.ars?utmsource-rss&utm medium=rss&utmcampaign=rss.
107 See Updated: New Zealand seeks to restrain ACTA, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/leak-new-zealand-opposes-acta. See generally
CONSOLIDATED TEXT PREPARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm send/1883.
08 Cory Doctorow, France's anti-piracy goon squad pirates the font in its logo,
BOINGBOING (Jan. 12, 2010, 10:22 PM), http://www.boingboing.net/2010/01/12/frances-
anti-piracy.html.
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that contain delivery information as well as substantive content.'" In the same
way that a postal employee can tamper with mail in transit, DPI enables ISPs
to tamper with packets in transit through their networks. Unlike the strict laws
against tampering with mail, however, there are no rules or regulations hold
ISPs accountable for nefarious behavior. 0
Tampering can also take the form of injecting falsified traffic into the net-
work data stream. ISPs may terminate a selected application's communications
by forging packets that trick end-users' computers into thinking that the con-
nection has been interrupted. There was such an occurrence in 2007, when an
engineer named Robb Topolski noticed that file transfers using the peer-to-
peer software BitTorrent were not transferring properly. Topolski discovered
that his ISP, Comcast Communications, was intercepting packets sent from his
computer and injecting reset packets that caused his computer to believe that
connections to BitTorrent servers had been aborted, causing the file transfer he
was attempting to slow down or to be terminated entirely."' In essence, Com-
cast was pretending to be one party involved in the file transfer and terminating
the communication, interrupting normal TCP/IP communication.112 The Asso-
ciated Press and the Electronic Frontier Foundation were able to duplicate To-
polski's results. At the time, Comcast had not disclosed that it was engaging in
this practice, and despite evidence implicating their network management prac-
tices, actually denied interfering with BitTorrent transfers at all. Eventually,
Comcast settled a class action lawsuit for $16 million."3
A user's ability to define its Internet experience depends on the freedom to
use the application of their choice. As the Comcast case highlights, an ISP does
not need to have direct access to a user's computer to exercise de facto control
109 ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 11 (2000).
1o The Open Internet Order adopted December 23, 2010 by the FCC does not directly
prohibit use of DPI. It only prohibits unreasonable network management practices. In re
Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, GN Docket
No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, 82 (Dec. 23, 2010).
111 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management", Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 1 9
(Aug. 1, 2008).
112 Id. at 8.
"3 Jacqui Cheng, Comcast settles P2P throttling class-action for $16 million, ARS
TECHNICA (Dec. 22, 2009, 3:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/12/comcast-throws-16-million-at-p2p-throttling-settlement.ars; Nate An-
derson, Just like Comcast? RCN accused of throttling P2P, ARs TECHNICA (Apr. 20, 2010,
12:42 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/just-like-comcast-rcn-accused-
of-throttling-p2p.ars .
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over which applications customers can run. The surreptitious nature of this
type of control effectively prohibits all but the most savvy users from knowing
when their communications are at risk.
7. Blocking Video
Faster broadband speeds have increased the viability of the Internet to dis-
tribute video content, but online video content is not universally accessible.
Some ISPs block content based on the location of the end-user, while others
block content according to the source of the content. In essence, network own-
ers are able to define what content users access, instead of the end-users them-
selves.
For example, blocked video content is commonplace on MLB.tv, Major
League Baseball's (MLB) Web site, which offers subscription service to allow
fans to watch "every out of market game" and advertises a total availability of
2,430 games."' However, the services stipulate that games are subject to local
black outs "in each applicable Club's home television territory.""' This is sig-
nificant not just because games are blacked out based on geographic location,
but because MLB.tv determines blackouts based upon users' IP addresses in
order to identify the location of each Web user."'
Agreements between content providers and ISPs frequently govern user ac-
cess to content. For example, ESPN3 offers a live video streaming service."'
These services are touted as "free of charge" for users who receive service
from a "participating high speed internet service provider.""' DSLreports.com
reports that these participating ISPs have paid ESPN for access to the content
for their uses,"' forcing customers to pay for a service even if they do not use
114 Mark Newman, MLB. TV is the ideal Gift for a Baseball Fan, MLB.COM (Dec. 16,
2010, 10:00 AM),
http://www.mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20101214&contentid=16320966&vkey-n
ews mlb&c id=mlb; see also MLB TV Demo Video, MLB.coM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?product-mlbtv&affiliateld=MLBTVREDI
RECT (last visited May 14, 2011) (stating that viewers would have access to "every out of
market game" and displaying an opening graphic showing the availability of 2,430 games,
subject to blackout and local market rules).
"5 See Watch Live Streaming Baseball Online with MLB.TV, MLB.coM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?product-mlbtv&affiliateld=MLBTVREDI
RECT (last visited May 14, 2011).
116 See id (noting that "MLB.com live game blackouts are determined in part by IP ad-
dress. MLB.com At Bat live game blackouts are determined using one or more reference
points, such as GPS and software within your mobile device. The Zip Code search is offered
for general reference only.").
" ESPNFact Sheet, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2010), http://espnmediazone3.com/wpmu/.
118 See ESPN 3 FAQ, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/broadband/espn360/faq#2 (last visited
May 14, 2011).
"l9 Karl Bode, Small ISPs Revolt Against ESPN360 Model, DSL REPORTS (Feb. 12,
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it, want it, or even know of its existence. Broadcasters have also used a similar
model to limit access to online content. When it aired the 2010 Winter Olym-
pics, NBC limited access to online content to users accessing the Internet
through ISPs that also have videos that included NBC content.'20 NBC also
reportedly asked Canadian ISPs to block access from U.S. users so that Ameri-
cans would have to watch programming during prime time hours, presumably
so NBC could charge a premium for advertising on their network.12'
Finally, it is important to note that proponents of content blocking and dec-
larations go well beyond networks such as ESPN, NBC, and MLB. The single
biggest purveyor of this technology is China,'22 which uses the same technolo-
gies to control access to content by its citizenry. While the rationale may be
different,'23 the technical underpinnings of this form of digital feudalism, re-
gardless of who perpetuates it, are the same.
C. Transport Layer Problems
The transport layer is responsible for quality control and reliability.'24 The
transport layer is the transmission control protocol (TCP) component of a
TCP/IP network and has been under attack by telecommunications companies
striving to integrate "quality of service" techniques that would oversee how
transport is controlled.'25
Several incumbents have begun a campaign for a false dichotomy between
speed and openness, arguing that capacity limitations, Quality of Service im-
plementations, and network management requirements require a more closed
approach at the transport layer.126 Whereas incumbents obviously benefit from
2009), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/100843; Karl Bode, ESPN 360 ISP Model
Spreads To HBO, Olympics, DSL REPORTS (Feb. 17, 2010)
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/106949.
120 See Alex Weprin, Zucker Defends NBCU's Online Strategy for Olympics,
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Apr. 1, 2010, 10:32 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/450958-
ZuckerDefends NBCU s OnlineStrategyforOlympics.php (explaining NBC's 2010
Olympic content policy).
121 Lisa Hoover, Where Can I Watch the Olympics Online, LIFEHACKER (Feb. 12 2010,
11:15AM), http://lifehacker.com/#!5469488/where-can-i-watch-the-olympics-online.
122 See How Censorship Works in China: A Brief Overview, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 2006), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm ("China's Internet regula-
tions may be among the most extensive and restrictive in the world.").
123 Id. (explaining that Chinese law censoring Internet content is based on the desire to
control its citizenry morally and politically).
124 Eric A. Hall, Internet Core Protocols: The Definitive Guide 8 (2000).
125 ANDREw G.BLANK, TCP/IP FOUNDATIONS 1 (2004); see also NEWTON'S TELECOM
DICTIONARY 1093 (25th ed. 2009).
126 See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Com-
ments ofAT&T Inc., GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 37 (Jan. 14, 2010)
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this dichotomy, the same cannot be said for the general public. The fact re-
mains that openness, by eliminating barriers to innovation, facilitates packet
flow, and upgrades paths, which in turn fosters higher speed networking.'27
Cable network operators face challenges over the medium-term as they at-
tempt to deal with severe architectural limitations and upgrade to DOCSIS
3.0. 128 On the other hand, Verizon and other fiber-heavy ISPs are in a good
position to leverage their speed into de-facto monopolies, yet they have dra-
matically slowed their planned rollouts, ceasing expansion to new cities in
2010.2'9 Speed alone does not lend itself to monopoly, but once speed becomes
a salient differentiator among networks (and without structural separation to
ensure that ISPs cannot leverage Layer 1 control to lock down everything else),
this is an area that will necessitate close observation in coming years.
1. Port blocking
A port is a software construct at the Transport layer that applications utilize
to streamline communication over protocols like TCP.'30 Much like boats or
planes use the same gates when loading and offloading customers, applications
often use specific ports for sending and receiving data packets.'"' When an ISP
blocks a specific port, it blocks any application that specifies that port for
communication.'32 Although technically savvy users can route around this
problem using port-forwarding,' port blocking is often the equivalent of a
(available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System)
127 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 1, 383-387. See also Ashsih Shat et. al., Thinking
About Openness in the Telecommunications Policy Context 12-13 (Thirty-First Telecomms.
Policy Research Conference, Sept. 20, 2003), available at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/244/openness2.pdf.
128 Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification ("DOCSIS") is s standard that de-
fines how to build a cable network to transport Internet traffic. See Data Over Cable Service
Interface Specifications: Physical Layer Specification, CABLE TELEVISION LABORATORIES,
INC. 1-4 (2010), http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/CM-SP-PHYv3.0-109-
101008.pdf.
129 Devindra Hardawar, Verizon slows down expansion of its FiOS fiber network,
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.venturebeat.com/2010/03/26/verizon-slows-
down-expansion-of-its-fios-fiber-network/.
130 See NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 875 (25th ed. 2009).
13' See Michael F. Morgan, The Cathedral and the Bizarre: An Examination of the "Vi-
ral"Aspects of the GPL, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 349, 380 (2010).
132 See, e.g., David McPhie, Almost Private: Pen Registers, Packet Snffers, and Privacy
at the Margin, STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 41 (2005).
"3 See Port Forwarding Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t-port+forwarding&i=49509,00.asp (last
visited May 14, 2011). See also ELIZABETH D. ZWICKY, SIMON COOPER, & D. BRENT
CHAPMAN, BUILDING INTERNET FIREWALLS, 505 (Deborah Russell & Nancy Crumpton, eds.,
2d ed. 2000) (explaining that port forwarding "require[s] some knowledge of how the proto-
cols work and the port numbers that are used.").
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denial of service for the average user.
Perhaps the most notable incident of port-blocking occurred in early 2005,
when VoIP provider Vonage reported that a local ISP blocked the use of its
application and requested an investigation by the FCC. 134 On February 11,
2005, the FCC began an investigation into non-functionality of Vonage on
Madison Internet service."' The FCC eventually found that Madison River
Telephone Company LCC "was cutting off access to Vonage and other VoIP
services by blocking certain IP ports.""' Madison River Telephone Company
was fined $15,000 and ordered to not "block ports used for VolP applications
or otherwise prevent customers from using VolP applications.""'
Port blocking can negatively impact numerous other applications as well. In
2004, Comcast began blocking port 25"' to stop spam sent from so-called
"zombie computers.""' Although Comcast reported a 35% decrease in spam,140
the blocking of port 25 made it difficult for individual users to send legitimate
e-mail using their own e-mail servers. It remains unclear how much of the 35%
in "spam" was actually legitimate e-mail traffic.141
Port blocking can also invade user privacy and mine personal information
by intercepting plain text, or limits what a user can accomplish with an Internet
connection. Telnet, an early protocol used to create virtual terminals, transmit-
ted data, including passwords, in plain text. Secure Shell (SSH) has replaced
Telnet in most instances and creates secure communication between two de-
vices. By creating a shell to encrypt data bits, communication can be resistant
to deep packet inspection or snooping of malicious hackers or those seeking to
look at what content you are transmitting or receiving. Default operation of
SSH requires Port 22.1'4 When this port is blocked, individuals lose the ability
134 Stephen Lawson, Vonage Says ISP Blocked Its Calls: A broadband provider pre-
vented customers from using its service, company says, PC WORLD (Feb. 16, 2005, 8:00
AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 19695/vonagesays isp blockedits calls.html.
1s In re Madison River Commc'ns, LLC & Affiliated Companies, Consent Decree, DA
Docket No. 05-543, at 1 3 (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Madison River Consent Decree],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf.
136 Madison River to Pay FCC $15,000 for Port Blocking, V2M vIsION2MOBILE (Mar. 7,
2005), http://www.vision2mobile.com/news/2005/03/madison-river-to-pay-fcc-15-000-for-
port-blocking.aspx.
'3 See Madison River Consent Decree, supra note 135, 5.
138 Port 25 is used for SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), the protocol used to send
outgoing email from an email client such as Mozilla Thunderbird or Microsoft Outlook.
Port Numbers), IANA.ORG, http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers (last visited May
14, 2011).
'3 Jim Hu, Comcast takes hard line against spam, CNET (June 10, 2004, 12:56 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1038_3-5230615.html.
140 Id
141 See Port 25 Block - Can't Send Mail via Non-SBC Servers, DSL REPORTS (Sept. 13,
2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.dslreports.com/faq/12321.
142 Jaikumar Vijayan, Novell Server Was Used to Look for Vulnerable Ports on Other
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to direct traffic to different places, conduct point-to-point tunneling, or main-
tain their security over the Internet. Thus, port blocking had directly infringed
on users right to privacy. Blocking ports can also block end-user functionality.
For example, Hypertext Transfer Protocol ("HTTP"), a vital protocol for dis-
playing WebPages, can be blocked by blocking port 80, and limit the ability
for an individual to run a webhosting server in their own home.
Ports are vital channels of communication for applications and servers.
While interfering with ports can at times be used for beneficial purposes, such
as preventing a denial of service attack or controlling spam, these restrictions
hinder normal operation of the Transport layer and can lead to the development
of more advanced malicious code.'43 Since many programmers know how to
port forward who are able to route around the problem,1' network operators
end up punishing users, preventing them from using legitimate services and
applications instead of those who engage in illegitimate actions. Furthermore,
ISPs often block various ports without disclosure or advanced notice,'45 leaving
consumers wondering why applications do not function as prescribed and un-
able to trust an application to work when needed.
D. Session Layer Problems
The Session layer manages the communication between computers and/or
devices. A session is a single connection, or transfer of packets, between con-
nected NICs.1' While a user who operates a web browser may only need one
session to download a webpage, the increasing complexity of today's Web
pages often necessitates multiple connections, or sessions.1"' Furthermore, by
running multiple sessions in parallel, one can greatly increase the page load
Computers, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 3, 2005, 12:00 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/105120/Novell ServerWasUsed-toLook-for
VulnerablePorts on Other Computers-Worldwide.
143 Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1233, 1280 (2007).
'" See also ELIZABETH D. ZWICKY, SIMON COOPER, & D. BRENT CHAPMAN, BUILDING
INTERNET FIREWALLS 505 (Deborah Russell & Nancy Crumpton, eds., 2d ed. 2000) (ex-
plaining that port forwarding "require[s] some knowledge of how the protocols work and
the port numbers that are used.").
145 See, e.g., Comcast Blocking TCP Port 22 Inbound - Comcast Help and Support Fo-
rums, Comcast.com, http://forums.comcast.com/t5/Connectivity-and-Modem-
Help/Comcast-blocking-TCP-Port-22-inbound/td-p/783356 (last visited May 14, 2011).
146 Paul Simoneau, The OSI Model: Understanding The Seven Layers of Computer Net-
works, GLOBALKNOWLEDGE.COM, 4, 7 (2006), http://www.crswann.com/4-
Misc/WPSimoneau OSIModel.pdf.
147 Mozilla Firefox 3, for example, allowed the user a default maximum of 6 simultane-
ous sessions connection with webservers, compared with the previous limit of 2.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en/xmlhttprequest. This limit can be changed by the user:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en/MozillaNetworkingPreferences.
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speed.148 Multiple sessions also permits multi-tasking, by allowing multiple
connections to webserver to simultaneous load different elements such as load
a streaming video, send an email, an even loading multiple pages all at once.
Session number limitations can dramatically impact how applications can en-
gage with the Internet, the functionality of those applications, and an end-
user's experience of those services and applications.
1. Session Limits
Beginning in 2005, and widely deployed in 2007, Comcast began monitor-
ing the number of open sessions of specific applications in a region.49 Using
switching equipment from Sandvine, the PTS 8210,'o Comcast was able to
"identify unidirectional P2P uploads" of predefined protocols, such as Ares,
BitTorrent, eDonkey, FastTrack, and Gnutella."' The Sandvine PTS 8210 is
capable of inspecting packet header information through stateful packet inspec-
tion ("SPI")5 2 and, as described in a filing to the FCC regarding the practice:
"Comcast established thresholds for the number of simultaneous unidirectional
uploads that can be initiated for each of the managed protocols in any given
geographic area."' When the thresholds were reached, Comcast began termi-
nating communication of the applications such as BitTorrent.
Comcast confounded the problem by creating thresholds for blocks of users
in specific geographic areas.'54 Thus, so-called "overuse" of a specific applica-
tion by one user can detrimentally impact legitimate use of that same applica-
tion by another user in the neighborhood. For example, when Comcast found
BitTorrent sessions that exceeded the Uni Threshold of 8 among a block of
users, their network management systems blocked additional functionality."
A knowledgeable user can circumvent SPI by directly connecting to a device
148 Faster Fox, for example, is an extension for Mozilla Firefox allowing the user to con-
trol the number of simultaneous connections to decrease the load time of websites. Faster
Fox, http://fasterfox.mozdev.org/screenshots.html
149 Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp.,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, File No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC
Docket No. 07-52, Attachment A, at 5 (Sept. 19, 2008)[hereinafter Comcast Network Man-
agement Practices], available at
http://downloads.comcast.net/docs/Attachment_A Current Practices.pdf.
o50 Sandvine PTS 8210 is widely deployed by providers to implement network manage-
ment techniques. See Sandvine Policy Traffic Switch 8210,
http://www.sandvine.com/downloads/documents/PTS8210_Datasheet.pdf (last visited May
14, 2011) (detailing product details and specifications).
'5 Id. at 7.
152 Id
153 Id. at 4.
154 Id
'5 See Comcast Network Management Practices, supra note 149, at 10.
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by secure tunneling, creating direct connection between two end-points and a
technique Topolksi used to discover that its network provider blocked BitTor-
rent.' However, Comcast implemented thresholds that are beyond any users
ability to control-because a single user in a network cannot prevent another
user from running the application of their choice. Comcast created a limit on
the use of a specific application independent of the actual capabilities of the
network and engaged in a collective reprisal against an entire geographic area
when it identified overuse. When these practices were discovered, Comcast
provided false information to consumers and the media, stating that traffic was
not being blocked, only "delayed" (the equivalent logic of stating that hanging
up the phone on someone does not terminate the call, only delays it).'" As the
Comcast example illustrates, the ability for network providers to limit sessions
negatively impacts a user's ability to control their communication over a net-
work.
E. Presentation Layer Problems
The presentation layer creates the framework for displaying information in
the application layer. Examples include protocols for the display of text, such
as American Standard Code for Information Interchange ("ASCII"). Presenta-
tion layer components can also include encryption and compression.'
].ASCH & Mime -- Websurfing & Email
ASCII is a character-encoding scheme that serves as the foundation for turn-
ing bits to text. Many character sets are based on ASCII,' but the code is in-
trinsically Americentric. Applications that utilize ASCII as the character-
encoding scheme cannot use non-Latin languages.' This became particularly
problematic with domain name addresses, in which every URL must display in
ASCII leaving entire language groups unable to build URLs in their native
tongues.'"'
156 Daniel Roth, The Dark Lord of Broadband Tries to Fix Comcast's Image, WIRED
(Jan. 19, 2009), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/1 7-02/mfbrianroberts.
15 Brad Stone, Comcast: We're Delaying, Not Blocking, BitTorrent Traffic, N.Y. TIMES
BITs BLOG (Oct. 22, 2007, 9:41 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/comcast-
were-delaying-not-blocking-bittorrent-traffic/.
158 VINT CERF, ASCII FORMAT FOR NETWORK INTERCHANGE, NETWORK WORKING GROUP.
(Octl6, 1969).
15 Many character sets are based on ascii such as UTF-8 and Unicode.
160 See ASCII character table. Vint Cerf 1969, supra note 158.
161 Id.
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On November 16, 2009, the International Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN"),'62 the body that coordinates naming schemes for the
Internet, launched the IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process, the first step to includ-
ing Internationalized Domain Names ("IDNs"). 6 1 IDNs, domain names and
extensions using non-Latin characters, would enable domain names could in-
clude non-Western languages for the first time.'" Although this is a dramatic
step forward, IDNs do not include all languages. Arabic, Chinese, Greek, and
Japanese are among the ten additional languages added thus far;'" but addi-
tional languages must be individually added through a request process.'
Multipurpose Internet Media Extension ("MIME") is a standard for format-
ting emails and providing support for body and headers in different character
sets and attachments.'6 ' Data included in a MIME header defines the type of
content in the email, if the message includes multiple parts, or if the data is
encrypted. Like ASCII, the application function of MIME must be included in
the MIME protocol. Defining the acceptable language of emails, if a character
or character set is excluded, it functionally does not exist, affecting both ad-
dresses and email content. Thus, MIME created an electronic communications
medium where certain languages can simply not be used to send e-mail to re-
cipients.
The presentation layer is essential for translating machine-readable data in a
user compatible form. However, limitations or restrictions at the presentation
can define what languages are permissible and create barriers to users.
F. Application Layer Problems
The application layer bridges the presentation of data with the end-user.
Providing the foundation for software, application layer elements include hy-
pertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and file transfer protocol (FTP). Enclosure to
162 See International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org.
163 See IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn (last
visited May 14, 2011).
' Jacqui Cheng, Say hello to . as domain names go truly global, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 30, 2009, 2:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2009/1 0/domain-extensions-go-
global-goodbye-com-welcome.ars.
165 See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, IDNs: INTERNATIONALIZED
DOMAIN NAMES 3 (2009), available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/factsheet-idn-
program-05junO9.pdf.
166 See The IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process is Open, , ICANN INTERNET CORP. FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/ (last visited
May 14, 2011) (noting that the current number of received fast track requests is 33, repre-
senting 22 languages).
167 See J. Klensin, N. Freed, M. Rose, E. Stefferud, D. Crocker, RFC 1426, SMTP Ser-
vice Extension for 8bit-MIMEtransport (Feb. 1993), http://tools.ietf.orgihtml/rfc 1426.
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the application layer can cripple applications and communication.
1.DNS Hiacking
The Domain Name System Protocol ("DNS protocol") is the translation of
IP addresses to text.'6' The protocol creates a system for more easily recogniz-
able web addresses, allowing users to enter a web address such as
www.newamerica.net, instead of the IP address 69.174.51.225. The web ad-
dress then matches to an IP address run by, in this example, Mzima Networks
and the New America Foundation's web server. If the query is resolved by a
NXDomain response, the user is directed to the website. If a domain name
does not exist, is not associated with an IP address, such as misspellings like
www.newamerca.net, a HTTP gives a 404 error indicating that the webpage or
server does not exist. Applications layer responses can interpret this error to
the user through messages. For example, Firefox displays a message that in-
structs users to "[c]heck the address for typing errors such as
[ww.example.com] instead of [www.example.com]."
Some ISPs have began implemented services where a server synthesizes an
NXDomain response if a DNS query is not resolved, redirecting traffic rather
than transmitting the error protocol to the application. In 2007, Cox Communi-
cations began experimenting with DNS redirection.'69 In June 2007, Verizon
began trials under their Web Search Service,' and Comcast began trials in
July 2009 for their Domain Name Helper service, redirecting mistyped URLs
to an advertisement heavy website with a search function.'' This service was
rolled out nationally in August 2009.172 Cox, Earthlink and Charter have all
used redirection as well."'7 In a preliminary report on DNS modification, the
ICANN Security and Stability Committee noted: "any party involved in the
68 See RAMESH BANGIA, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 177-178 (2010)
(describing the domain name system).
169 Karl Bode, Cox Tests DNS Redirection Though they provide unimpacted DNS Serv-
ers, BROADBAND DSL REPORTS (May 19, 2007)
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/83929.
170 Karl Bode, Verizon DNS Redirection the latest ISP to profit off your butterfingers,
BROADBAND DSL REPORTS (June 20, 2007), http://www.dsIreports.com/shownews/Verizon-
DNS-Redirection-85063.
171 Chris Griffiths, Domain Helper Service: Here to Help You, Comcast Voices,
COMCAST VOICES (July 9, 2009), http://blog.comcast.com/2009/07/domain-helper-service-
here-to-help-you.html.
172 Id. See Chris Griffiths, Domain Helper National Rollout Begins, COMCAST VOICES
(Aug. 4, 2009), http://blog.comcast.com/2009/08/domain-helper-national-rollout-
begins.html.
13 Karl Bode, Verizon DNS Redirection 'Service' Spreads, BROADBAND DSL REPORTS
(Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Verizon-DNS-Redirection-Service-
Spreads-89137.
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resolution process can perform NXDOMAIN redirection for every name which
it determines or is notified does not exist, regardless of whether or not an au-
thoritative server gives an NXDOMAIN." 7 4
DNS redirection can be a profitable endeavor whereby enclosure of tradi-
tional application layer functionality and neutral error messages can generate
significant revenue. Often, web users would need to opt out of these redirec-
tion "services" if they want to actually know what errors they are actually re-
ceiving when a web page will not load. According to DSLreports.com, DNS
redirection can boost revenue for ISPs by $5 per month for every user."'
ICANN Senior Security Technologist Dave Piscitello has expanded the possi-
bility for redirection, suggesting that it could be used for other IP-based appli-
cations such as redirecting e-mail or a VolP phone call to a wrong number.'
One example of a more invasive redirect occurred in April 2010 when users
found that Windstream was redirecting their searches using the Google search
bar to a competitor's search service,'" though Windstream called this redirec-
tion accidental and changed it the next day, it demonstrates how easily one
could hijack traffic to send it to another site.' 78 For example, an ISP could redi-
rect all traffic from Ford.com to Chevy.com or all traffic to McDonalds.com to
BurgerKing.com. The ICANN board has banned the practice of redirection for
new top level domains, however, as of this writing, ISPs such as Verizon and
Comcast continue redirecting mistyped domains to their own services.'
2.H.264 and the Future of Online Video
As another example, the pooling of licenses for the H.264 codec is standard-
izing not only the technology, but the terms by which the technology itself can
be used-thus already impacting the trajectory of innovation for next-
174 ICANN SECURITY AND STABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAC 032 PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON DNS RESPONSE MODIFICATION 6, (June 2008), available at
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac032.pdf.
17 Karl Bode, ICANN Slams DNS Redirection, BROADBAND DSL REPORTS, (Nov. 25,
2009), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/ICANN-Slams-DNS-Redirection- 105651.
176 Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN Start, Episode 1: Redirec-
tion and Wildcarding (Mar. 2010), transcript available at
http://www.icann.org/en/leaming/transcript-icann-start-01-22mar10-en.pdf.
1n Karl Bode, Windstream Hiacking Firefox Google Toolbar Results, BROADBAND DSL
REPORTS (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/107744.
17 Karl Bode, Windstream Gives (Sort Of) Explanation For Google Search Hijack,
BROADBAND DSL REPORTS (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/107828.
' ICANN first "condemned" redirection in their 2009 Explanatory Memorandum.
ICANN NEW GTLD PROGRAM EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 2 et seq. (Nov. 24, 2009); See
Karl Bode, ICANN Slams DNS Redirection, BROADBAND DSL Reports (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/ICANN-Slams-DNS-Redirection-105651 (describing
how the ICANN "condemned" redirection).
2011] 457
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
generation video services. The rising prevalence of online video has drawn
attention to its dependency on third-party applications, such as Adobe Flash or
Microsoft Silverlight."'8 The latest standards for hypertext markup language
("HTML") include new tags for making video support native, allowing users to
view online video without external plugins. However, although the Internet is
predicated on open standards one video standard included in HTML5 is the
H.264 codec, a proprietary standard owned by the MPEG LA group."' With
licenses held by Microsoft, Apple and others,'"' this codec builds privately
owned, and potentially very expensive, standard into the Internet.
Video codecs are needed for encoders and decoders, such as video software,
browsers, or video capable recording devices like digital cameras, or for con-
tent providers, such YouTube or over-the-air-television."' However, because
H.264 is privately owned producers of software, browsers, or video recording
devices will potentially have to pay to include the video standard. The avail-
ability of no-cost H.264 licenses were set to expire at the end of 2010, but
MPEG LA in February 2010 announced an extension for no-cost licenses for
"Internet Video that is free to end users (known as Internet Broadcast AVC
Video)" through 2015.84 This postpones the requirement that Vimeo or You-
Tube pay license fees for free video, but requires software developers to pay
tribute in order to be compatible with online video. It remains to be seen what
will happen in 2015, once the standard is more thoroughly embedded in multi-
ple products.
The H.264 codec and its inclusion in HTML 5 has the potential to create a
new bottleneck that captures a growing amount of online video traffic and
could be utilized as a toll booth to create new "billable moments" for using
these services. H.264 is quickly becoming the standard for online video. As of
180 Adobe Flash and Microsoft are two existing plugins for displaying online video con-
tent. See, e.g., Adobe Flash, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/; Microsoft
Silverlight, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/silverlight.
181 For more about MPEG LA, the patent pool behind H.264 and other MPEG standards,
see MPEGLA - The Standard for Standards, MPEG LA, LLC,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/default.aspx.
182 See A VC/H. 264 Licensors, MPEG LA, LLC,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/AVC/Pages/Licensors.aspx (last visited May 14,
2011) (naming Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, Microsoft and Sony among the number of licensors
of H.264).
183 See generally MPEG LA, SUMMARY OF AVC/H.264 LICENSE TERMS, available at
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/avc/Documents/AVCTermsSummary.pdf (last
visited May 14, 2011).
184 Press Release, Corrected Version of February 2, 2010 News Release Titled "MPEG
LA's AVC License Will Continue Not to Charge Royalties for Internet Video that is Free to
End Users" (Feb. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.mpegla.com/Lists/MPEG%20LA%20News%20List/Attachments/226/n- 10-02-
02.pdf.
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May 1, 2010, an estimated 66% of video content online is available through the
H.264 codec, with the majority push coming from YouTube.' Constraining
video to a particular license scheme is very troubling. Mozilla, for example,
would need to pay a reported $5 million license fee in order to play H.264 en-
coded video on its Firefox web browser.'"' The license terms for H.264 could
also be extended to devices like cameras and video game consoles as well as
software, where this function is currently available for free.'
IV. THE NEED FOR OPEN TECHNOLOGY
At its heart, one of the most significant barriers to reform comes down to the
differences between closed and open technologies. These notions often bring to
mind issues related to open source and proprietary software (e.g., Linux versus
Windows), but the distinction is more encompassing. Stolterman defines the
important attributes as follows:
A closed technology is one that does not allow the user to change anything
after it has been designed and manufactured. The structure, functionality and
appearance of the art[i]fact are permanent. . . . The technology is a relatively
stable variable in social settings . . . . An open technology allows the user to
continue changing the technology's specific characteristics, and to adjust,
add/or change its functionality. When it comes to an open technology, changes
in functionality pose a question not only of change in the way the existing
functionality is used or understood but also of a real change in the art[i]fact's
internal manifestation.'
The Internet was conceived and remains an open and designable technology.
One can "add, embed, contain or surround the art[i]fact with other technology
in a way that radically changes it."' This aspect has contributed to the suc-
cesses of "Web 2.0" applications. However, actions such as Comcast blocking
BitTorrent communications, the blocking of pro-choice text messaging by Ver-
85 YouTube is estimated to account for 40% of all online video content. See Erick
Schonfeld, H.264 Already Won-Makes Up 66 Percent Of Web Videos, TECHCRUNCH (May
1, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/05/01/h-264-66-percent-web-video/.
186 Stephen Shankland, Mozilla takes on YouTube video choice, CNET (Jan. 22, 2011,
2:16 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-10440430-264.html.
187 The license for H.264 used in digital cameras such as the Canon 5D or videos edited
in Final Cut Pro only allows non-commercial use. See EOS 5D Mark II Instruction Manual
241 (2010), available at http://gdlp01.c-wss.com/gds/6/0300001676/02/eos5dmkii-im3-
en.zip; Apple Inc. Final Cut Studio Software License Agreement, at 3, available at
http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/finalcutstudio2.pdf (last visited May 14, 2011).
188 Erik Stolterman, Creating community in conspiracy with the enemy, in COMMUNITY
INFORMATICS: SHAPING COMPUTER-MEDIATED SOCIAL RELATIONS 43, 45 (Leigh, Keeble &
Brian D. Loader ed. 2001).
189 Id.
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izon, and the editing of a live Pearl Jam's concert by AT&T all attack this open
framework. "'
While corporations promise not to engage in such practices,'9' these "gen-
tlemen's agreements" do nothing to prevent anti-competitive, anti-free speech,
and anti-democratic actions from being repeated in the future. Unfortunately,
by abdicating their responsibility to prevent this sort of corporate malfeasance,
the FCC and other regulatory agencies are all but guaranteeing that these be-
haviors will continue.' As we have shown, discriminatory practices are being
built into the very foundations of next-generation network infrastructure.
A. Limitations on Today's Closed Networks
As the wireless industry aptly demonstrates, the convergence of networks
and devices threaten user freedom. Many cellular phones are released with ex-
clusivity agreements and carriers often restrict the functionality of the phones.
For example, when Verizon introduced the Motorola V710 - the carrier's first
phone with Bluetooth functionality - 19 it removed the ability to transfer files
over Bluetooth,'94 forcing customers who wanted to do so to buy another ac-
cessory or pay for additional services. The Motorola Razr was one of the most
190 See Gil Kaufman, AT&TAdmits It Edited Webcasts Before Pearl Jam's, MTV NEWS
(Aug.13, 2007, 3:31 PM),
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1566946/20070813/pearljam.jhtml; Adam Liptak, Veri-
zon Blocks Messages ofAbortion Rights Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at Al.
19' AT&T has argued there is transparency "mandates would be both unnecessary and
counterproductive in the wireless context" suggesting competition is sufficient. See In re
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of AT&T, Inc., GN
Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020916485. Google and Verizon, one of the
largest Internet companies and one of the largest ISPs, offered a proposal of agreeable terms
that were largely incorporated by the FCC for their Open Internet Rules, such as the general
exclusion of wireless from meaningful consumer protections. Google Public Policy Blog: A
Joint Policy Proposal for an Open Internet, GOOGLE (Aug. 9, 2010, 1:38 PM),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/08/joint-policy-proposal-for-open-
internet.html
192 For example, on November 5, 2010 the Benton Foundation, Center for Media Justice,
Consumers Union and Public Knowledge urged the FCC to act on Open Internet rules rather
than form market consensus. See In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry
Practices, Reply Comments of Benton Foundation, Center for Media Justice, Consumers
Union, Media Access Project, New America Foundation, and Public Knowledge, GN Dock-
et No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/PICWirelessreply comments.pdf.
19 Carmen Nobel, Verizon to Launch Its First Bluetooth Phone, EWEEK (July 26, 2004),
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/Verizon-to-Launch-Its-First-Bluetooth-
Phone/.
194 Sascha Segan, Motorola V710, PCMAg (Aug. 26, 2004),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1639784,00.asp.
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popular phones of the past decade, shipping 50 million units by July 2006,'"
yet different networks offered different models. Essentially carriers competed
based on device not network capabilities.
The problems with this approach are best epitomized by the 2007 deal be-
tween Apple and AT&T, in which Apple made it's iPhone available to only
AT&T's network, even though it could be used on any cellular network.'
Likewise, AT&T only allows certain services and applications to run on the
iPhone, even though the iPhone could run many additional programs that
would be useful for end users. Innovative iPhone owners and entrepreneurs
quickly found ways to unlock their device and install a growing option of after-
market applications, but the business practice of "exclusive deals" is anti-
competitive and results in extra work and costs are borne by the end-user. Al-
though Apple released an application store in July 2008, it continues to keep
tight control over what types of applications are available in the store. For ex-
ample, Apple rejected some applications, such as Google Voice, because they
"duplicate features that come with the phone."' Others were limited in the
features they could offer. Thus, while Apple allowed Major League Baseball's
application to stream video over 3G wireless, it limited streaming on Skype to
Wi-Fi. Apple only announced in 2010 that it would allow VoIP applications
over 3G networks into the iTunes App Store.' However, Apple has gone so
far as to dictate in the iPhone Developer Program License Agreement that only
certain programming techniques are allowed on their device and that "applica-
tions that link to Documented APIs through an intermediary translation or
compatibility layer or tool are prohibited."' 99 Apple rescinded this policy fol-
195 See Press Release, Motorola Media Center, Motorola Ships 50 Millionth
MOTORAZR (July 18, 2006) (available at
http://www.motorola.com/mediacenter/news/detail.jsp?globalObjectld=7031698023).
196 See Barb Dybwad, AT&T has iPhone exclusivity until 2012, CNN TECH (May 11,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-11/tech/iphone.att.2012.mashable I apple-and-at-t-
iphone-app-store?_s=PM:TECH (announcing the exclusivity deal between AT&T and Ap-
ple for their iPhone service). Although Verizon announced they would begin carrying the
iPhone 4 in February 2010, current AT&T customers would incur an early termination fee
of up to $325. The earliest an iPhone 4 customer on AT&T could switch to an alternative
carrier without this switching cost would be summer 2012, nearly 18 months after an alter-
native was announced. See Early Termination Fees, AT&T WIRELESS,
http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-resources/early-term-fees.jsp (last visited May
14, 2011).
'9 Jason Kincaid, Apple Is Growing Rotten To The Core: Official Google Voice App
Blocked From App Store, TECHCRUNCH (July 27, 2009),
http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/27/apple-is-growing-rotten-to-the-core-and-its-likely-atts-
fault/.
198 Stacey Higginbotham, Apple Brings 3G VoIP to the iPhone, GIGAOM (Jan. 28, 2010,
11:35 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/01/28/apple-brings-3g-voip-to-the-iphone/.
199 Brian X. Chen, Adobe Apps: Easier to Pass Through the 'i' of a Needle?, WIRED
(Apr. 8, 2010, 8:12 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/04/iphone-developer-
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lowing an antitrust investigation by the European Union. 200 Carriers and hand-
set manufacturers have collaborated to prevent the "jailbreaking" of mobile
devices by keeping some software components in read-only memory or design-
ing devices that automatically deactivate if unauthorized software is de-
tected.2 o' In contrast, the benefits of open architectures are clear:
An open architecture means fewer technological restrictions and, thus, the
ability to explore more options. In an open architecture, there is no list of ele-
ments and protocols. Both are allowed to grow and change in response to
changing needs and technology innovation. With an open architecture you are
not making bets on a specific direction the technology will take in the future.
You are not tied to a specific design or a particular vendor or consortium
roadmap, so you can evaluate and select the best solution from a broad and
energetic competitive field. Competition facilitates innovation and reduces
equipment and implementation costs. 202
The costs of closed architectures are particularly devastating because they
impact almost every communications medium. Further, with the dissonance in
openness between wireless and wireline networks, and the FCC's push for
wireless to provide competition for wireline networks, the need for open net-
works has never been greater.20 Although both Verizon and AT&T have de-
clared their intention to run open networks, and the terms of 700 MHz spec-
trum auction included openness requirements on the new "C-Block" mobile
phone band, 2 these details have not yet been clearly defined. While these ap-
proximations of openness are only baby steps from a fully proprietary infra-
structure, it is encouraging that the trend is toward a more open, interoperable,
and innovation-supporting network.
Most municipal and enterprise 802.11 (Wi-Fi/WiMAX) wireless networks
policy/.
200 Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Statement on Apple's iPhone policy
changes (Sept. 25, 2010) (available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1175&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
201 Dan Meredith, Josh King, Sascha Meinrath, & James Losey, Mobile Devices are
Increasingly Locked Down and Controlled by the Carriers: How Cell Phone "Customiza-
tion" Undermines End-Users by Redefining Ownership, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct.
13, 2010),
http://oti.newamerica.net/blogposts/20 10/mobiledevices are increasinglylocked down_a
ndcontrolled bythe_carriers-38418.
202 John C. Waclawsky, Closed Systems, Closed Architectures, & Closed Minds, 5 Bus.
COMMC'N REv. 61 (2004).
203 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at ch. 4.
204 In re Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network
in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements
for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through
the Year 2010, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15289, 15371, 224 (2007).
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are entirely proprietary. 205 For example, a Motorola 802.11 system will not
interoperate directly with a Tropos system, which will not interoperate directly
with a Meru system, which will not interoperate directly with a Meraki system,
etc. In fact, most consumers have no idea that the links they rely on to access
Internet and Intranet services lock geographical areas into distinct path de-
pendencies with specific vendors (and their specific capabilities and limita-
tions). Many incorrectly assume the interoperability of applications, services,
and communications, and the communities that people participate in are geo-
graphically dispersed, the immediate and long-term ramifications of this geo-
spatial lock-in remain almost entirely unexplored. Closed technologies have
the potential to constrain the positive potentials of the Internet if their wide-
spread adoption stems more from an emphasis on corporate profits than maxi-
mizing wireless networks' public benefits. Today's battles over 802.1 In Wi-Fi
systems, WiMax, and 4G networking are all indicators of this ongoing tension.
Unlike the Internet, these wireless "last-mile" links can disallow users from
extending the network (e.g., using bridges and routers), adding applications
(e.g., VoIP, P2P, IRC, IM), interconnecting additional services (e.g., streaming
servers, distributed file storage, local webhosting), or connecting directly with
one another. The wireless medium resembles the era when AT&T's control
over which devices could be connected to their network and which technolo-
gies would thus be developed. The long-term effects of wireless lock-in may
be more detrimental than any policy previously witnessed in telecommunica-
tions history.
Thus far, regulatory bodies and decision-makers remain unwilling to address
these fundamental concerns. While President Obama's first Chairman of the
FCC, Julius Genachowski, had initially proposed to eliminate these discrimina-
tory practices, the rules adopted by the FCC in late 2010 are limited and will
not eliminate discrimination.206 The first decade of the 21st century has drawn
to a close and this inaction may have profound impacts on the development of
feudalistic communications systems in the years to come. Emphasizing the
enclosures that can be employed at different layers of communications tech-
nology illuminates the imperative of situating this debate within a larger vision
of Internet openness. Today, we sit at a critical juncture for Internet policy and
the opportunities that now abound for graceful reforms will soon disappear.
205 See Vijay Chandramouli, A Detailed Study on Wireless LAN Technologies 5-6 (Dept.
of Comp. Sci. and Engineering, Univ. of Texas at Arlington), available at
http://www.uta.eduloit/policy/ns/docs/wireless-paper-vijay.pdf
206 See In re Matter of Preserving the Open Internet broadband Industry Practices, Report
and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, 39-43 (Dec. 21, 2010).
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW CRITICAL
JUNCTURE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Many have analogized the Obama administration's treatment of the Internet
to circumvent traditional media to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) use of
radio during his fireside chats.207 However, many forget the more cautionary
tale that this historical parallel exemplifies: FDR failed to seize the initiative to
set the new media of broadcasting on a democratic course when he had a
chance. As a result, the broadcast media became not only largely commercial-
ized, but also largely inoculated against public interest regulation, never reach-
ing its full democratic potential.208 To avoid a similar fate, we suggest a list of
policy recommendations to steer our new digital potentials toward more de-
mocratic ends.209
A. Physical Layer Solutions
First, we recommend that the FCC overturn its decision following the Brand
X Supreme Court case2 0 and restore common carriage provisions to all Internet
service providers. Common carriage ensures that network operators lease their
lines to all potential market players at wholesale market rates. Reforms should
include universal service provisions and service level agreements for all users
(business, residential, municipal, NGO, etc.). As the history of transportation
and telecommunications demonstrates, common carriage regulation protects
the general public against price and geographic discrimination and other anti-
competitive business practices. From 2000 to 2005, the number of Internet ser-
vice providers shrunk by nearly 50% from 9,335 in 2001 to 4,417 in 2005.21
With the demise of common carriage provisions resulting from the Brand X
Supreme Court decision, this number continued to decrease-in the 2010 Na-
207 During his presidency, Franklin Roosevelt held radio addresses he called "Fireside
Chats." See FDR Fireside, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/educationlessons/fdr-fireside/. President Obama has in turn used
online video to reach out to the public. See, e.g., White House Live, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/live (providing live video feed of the President's addresses and
speeches).
208 Victor Pickard, Media Democracy Deferred: The Postwar Settlement for U.S. Com-
munications, 1945-49, (2008) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of Illinois) (on file with author).
209 This paper further fleshes out recommendations previously laid out for creating a
more democratic Internet. See generally Sascha D. Meinrath & V. W. Pickard, The New
Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom, INT'L J. OF CoMMc'Ns L. & POL'Y 225,
237-239 (2008).
210 BrandX, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
211 See Number ofFirms, Number ofEstablishments, Employment and Annual Payroll by
Employment Size of the Enterprise for the United States, All Industries 2005, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2005/us_6digitnaics-2005.xls
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tional Broadband Plan, the FCC revealed that 96% of Americans have access
to 2 or fewer ISPs. 2 12 Furthermore, price remains a primary barrier to adoption
of Broadband2 3 and prices continue to rise.214 Research from the Pew Internet
and American Life project documents that prices are higher when consumers
only have one or two providers to choose from.2 5 The Harvard Berkman Cen-
ter has documented the success of open access and common carrier policies in
leading broadband nations. 216 The FCC reclassification of broadband as a Title
II communications is an essential step to revamping the failed market duopoly
in the United States.
B. Spectrum Recommendations
In addition, current federal spectrum regulation creates a false scarcity of
spectrum availability." The current practice of allocating blocks of spectrum
212 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at 37.
213 According to a Federal Communications Commission report 36% of Americans who
have not adopted broadband cite cost as the primary reason. A report from the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration documents that price is a main reason
for 26.3% of non-adopters. See John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America
28 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, OBI Working Paper Series No. 1, Feb. 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-296442A l.pdf; NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL NATION: 21ST
CENTURY AMERICA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS UNIVERSAL BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS 13
(2010), available at
http://www.ntia.gov/reports/2010/NTIAinternet_usereport Feb2010.pdf. See also George
S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak & Michael L. Stern, The Broadband Credibility Gap, 19
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 75, 92 (2010) (describing Horrigan's analysis of a consumer's base-
line to adopt broadband and asking whether competition can ensure that both prices and
practices are "just and reasonable").
214 JOHN HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICA LIFE PROJECT, HOME BROADBAND
ADOPTION 2009: BROADBAND ADOPTION INCREASES, BUT MONTHLY PRICES DO TOO 25 (June
2009).
215 Id. at 26-27.
216 See BERKMAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 136-137.
217 See Stuart M. Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 18, 19-20 (2002) (providing
"[t]he limitation on additional uses [of spectrum] means that, even if a licensee can
identify a supplemental use of its spectrum that will not interfere with other uses or
with its existing uses, the government will not permit the additional service to be of-
fered. The result is that potentially valuable spectrum lies underused . .. Other services
(notably, third generation wireless telephony) would love to use that spectrum, but the
FCC has not allowed other uses and the spectrum remains underutilized.").
See also William Lehr, The Role of Unlicensed in Spectrum Reform, at I (Mar. 17, 2005),
available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/lehr/Lehr-
Papers files/lehr/2role%2oUnclicensed%20in%2oSpectrum%2oReform.pdf (explaining
that "Under the traditional approach, regulators allocate narrow frequency bands to specific
uses and users under restrictive licenses that constraint the choice of technology, business
model, and the ability to redeploy the spectrum to higher value uses or to make use of new
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to exclusive use by single entities ignores the technological strides made over
the past 75 years. Allowing devices to operate with closer adjacency and that
facilitate multiple users within discrete frequency bands. Additionally, we note
that unlicensed spectrum has already proven to be a tremendous boon for inno-
vation and advancing networking technologies and should be dramatically in-
creased. 2 8
Wi-Fi serves as a striking example of the tremendous benefits of unlicensed
spectrum. Unlicensing the 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz bands has enabled roaming
connectivity in homes and businesses, easy Internet access in coffee shops and
on airplanes, and mesh networking that is essential to community and munici-
pal broadband networks around the world. Wi-Fi is also an essential compo-
nent for current cellular phone networks. According to the mobile phone indus-
try, the rapid uptake of smart phones and slow build out of additional cellular
capacity have created network congestion.219 Cell phone operators have urged
the FCC for more spectrum to expand bandwidth, and the Obama administra-
tion has recommended making 500 MHz of spectrum available for broadband
access over the next ten years.220 Cellphone networks, as they are currently
operated are becoming oversold and congested. For example, at one time a
nearly 25% fail rate for phone calls in New York using an iPhone with AT&T
was reportedly considered normal.22 However, unlicensed bands can offer
greater network relief than increased licenses to incumbent carriers. Data from
Admob, an advertising company that collects data on traffic use to partner ap-
plications and websites, reveals that 55% of traffic from Wi-Fi-enabled smart
phones is from Wi-Fi connections.22 2 Likewise, creating national unlicensed
technologies. This approach has resulted in acute spectrum scarcity. This scarcity is largely
artificial in that it results from an outmoded regulatory regime, rather than because of any
technical or market capacity constraints.") (emphasis added).
218 For example, devices from baby monitors to cordless phones all share the same fre-
quencies with laptops and home computers. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N., SPECTRUM POLICY
TASKFORCE REPORT OF THE UNLICENSED DEVICES AND EXPERIMENTAL LICENSES WORKING
GROUP 5-6 (Nov. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/E&UWGFinalReport.pdf.
219 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at 77 ("The growth of aggregate
traffic is due to an increased adoption of Internet-connected mobile computing devices and
increased data consumption per device."). See generally RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE
BROADBAND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE NEED FOR OPTIMIZATION 2 (FEB. 24, 2010)
(providing analysis and examples of network congestion caused by the proliferation of new
cellular technologies without a matching buildout).
220 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 7, at 84.
221 A widely reported work receipt shows that an iPhone dropping over 22% of calls and
phone is "fully functional and the problem is consistent with service provided by ATT
[sic]." Matt Buchanan, Apple Genius Bar: iPhones' 30 Percent Call Drop Is "Normal" in
New York, GIzMODo, Sept. 29, 2009, http://gizmodo.com/5370493/apple-genius-bar-
iphones-30-call-drop-is-normal-in-new-york.
222 ADMOB MOBILE METRICS REPORT 3 (Nov. 2009), available at
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GSM bands would enable anyone to build cellular infrastructure that could
utilize today's popular cell phone handsets while relieving congestion on exist-
ing networks.
Opportunistic Spectrum Access ("OSA") would allow for secondary use of
spectrum, and if permitted, could considerably increase unlicensed space avail-
able for end-users and innovators. A test in 2004 as part of a National Science
Foundation research project found that spectrum efficiency is close to 5% and
that even in major metropolitan cities, the highest utilization is around 17%.223
The current framework for allocating spectrum assumes the need for a single
entity to have absolute control over this spectrum and ignores the technological
realities like cognitive radios, which can change frequencies in real-time. If
roadways were distributed like spectrum, cars would be assigned permanent
lanes and would never be allowed to change lanes for any reason. As commen-
tators have summed up: "Imagine traffic laws which require that each lane in
the highway is dedicated to particular makes of car-BMWs and Saabs use lane
1, Toyotas and Fords lane 2, and so on. A Toyota cannot use lane 1 even if that
lane is empty!" 224 As we saw so dramatically during 9/11 and Hurricane Katri-
na, this methodology can easily bring networks to their knees when one of the
spectrum "lanes" is destroyed-a far more robust telecommunications system
would adapt to changing conditions, allowing devices to change frequencies as
necessary.225 Today, at any given time, 19 out of 20 lanes on the spectrum
freeway have no traffic, yet cars would be impeded from driving on them, be-
ing forced to all share the single remaining lane. It is time for the FCC to
change its rules to allow cognitive radios that are able to detect if a given fre-
quency is in use, and change frequency, power, and modulation in real time to
utilize these underused frequencies.
TV White Spaces, empty slots and guard bands between TV channels that
were originally intended to minimize interference among stations, is one area
where cognitive radios could be use. Unfortunately, although the FCC has ex-
plored this issue, as of this writing, the FCC has been delayed in approving
rules for TV White Spaces. Radio technology has evolved by leaps and bounds
since the current framework of spectrum allocation was first conceived over
http://metrics.admob.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AdMob-Mobile-Metrics-Nov-09.pdf
223 See Spectrum Usage Reports, supra note 46 et. seq. and accompanying discussion
(detailing the spectrum efficiencies in such metropolitan areas as New York and Chicago).
224 C. Santivanez, R. Ramanathan, C. Partridge, R. Krishnan, M. Condell & S. Polit,
Opportunistic Spectrum Access: Challenges, Architecture, Protocols 1 (Paper Prepared for
2d Annual International Wireless Internet Conference (WiCon'06), Aug. 2-5, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.ir.bbn.com/-ramanath/pdf/osa-wicon06.pdf.
225 Wireless Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina Presentation given at the Muni-
Wireless Conference, (Mar. 6, 2006, Atlanta, GA), available at
http://www.saschameinrath.com/files/2006-03-
06%20Wireless%20Lessons%2OLearned%20from%20Hurricane%20Katrina.ppt
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half a century ago. As of a 2005 study, broadcasters use less than 30% of the
available frequencies in many rural areas.226 As the FCC's own testing has do-
cumented, White Space Devices ("WSDs") can detect TV signals at levels
1/1000 of the signal power needed by televisions to display a picture, thus mi-
nimizing the chances of harmful interference.227 WSDs detect if given fre-
quency is in use and utilize empty bands as needed. In 2008, the FCC issued
rules allowing WSDs, but the rules were contingent on further rules such as the
creation of a geolocational database that these devices would query to identify
which frequencies they can utilize.228 An FCC order in September, 2010 ap-
proved the use of unlicensed devices operating at I watt or less, but reserva-
tions for wireless microphones limits the potential for so called "Super Wi-Fi"
in urban markets.229
OSA is also valuable and applicable beyond the TV broadcast bands. The
federal government makes over 270,000 license allocations and assignments,
yet some of these are seasonal or in use only in cases of national emergency or
for particular, exceedingly rare occurrences.230 Maintaining priority for federal
users while allowing secondary access to these bands will preserve the right of
the government license holders to use this spectrum, while allowing the fre-
quencies to be used the 95% of the time the airwaves are completely open.
Spectrum is essential both for mobile connectivity, but also for fixed wireless
networks in low-population density areas like rural regions and Native Ameri-
can Tribal lands. Spectrum is an increasingly essential public resource and its
mismanagement directly contributes to the digital divide.
C. Data Link & Network Layer Solutions
We recommend policies that promote open architecture and open source
driver development in order to encourage a digital commons. As the Open
Source movement gains ground and hardware prices fall, new business models
capture downstream markets and create opportunities for secondary network
enclosures. Key officials have already begun to challenge governmental over-
reliance on proprietary technology. On October 16, 2009, David M. Wenner-
226 BEN ScoTr & MICHAEL CALABRESE, FREE PRESS AND NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
MEASURING THE TV "WHITE SPACE" AVAILABLE FOR UNLICENSED WIRELESS BROADBAND I-
2 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/whitespace%20summary.pdf.
227 See In re Matter of Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands Additional
Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, Second Report
and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 16807, 176 (Nov. 4, 2008).
228 Id. 1-2.
229 Id
230 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 39, at 433-434.
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grem, CIO for the U.S. Department of Defense issued a memorandum support-
ing the advantages of open source software.23 1 In January 2010, Teri Takai,
CIO for the State of California issued a memorandum "formally establishing
the use of Open Source Software" for the state government.232 Open architec-
tures and access layers help promote competition by creating opportunities for
new market entrants and encouraging rapid innovation.
We also recommend that private networks do not privilege state security
imperatives that compromise individual privacy rights wholesale and that they
help ensure a non-discriminatory environment for content access and informa-
tion dissemination. Private networking is essential to ensuring the continued
expansion of online business, though back doors and other surveillance devices
introduce enormous security holes. Likewise, privacy-invasive techniques,
when widely deployed, increase impetus for the development and widespread
adoption of privacy software that hampers, over the long-term, legitimate law
enforcement efforts.
ISPs, including wireless carriers, should not discriminate against lawful con-
tent and applications. Some network management schemes, such as IMS, treat
different types of data differently and interfere with normal network operation
of the network and transport layers. As the FCC itself has recognized, non-
discrimination is essential to preserving a free and open Internet... and prevent-
ing a data-obfuscation arms race that will inevitably create additional head-
aches for future system administrators. Low-latency and first-in/first-out rout-
ing protocols help remove the impetus for data packet and application dis-
crimination by requiring that a service providers be responsible for provision-
ing adequate capacity for its customer base. Service level agreements and min-
imum speed guarantees help lower over-subscription rates, artificial scarcity
and the hoarding of dark fiber and spectrum assets by mandating adequate ca-
pacity and providing incentive for network and capacity upgrades.
We recommended all ISPs, both wired and wireless, be required to allow
any lawful content and application. Although the FCC has issued Open Inter-
net rules, the rules differentiate between wireline and wireless technologies.234
The "No Blocking" restriction for wireless is limited to websites and "applica-
231 Memorandum from David Wernergrem, Acting Chief Information Officer (CIO),
Dept. of Defense (DOD), Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Re:
Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software (OSS) (Oct. 16, 2009), (available at
http://cio-nii.defense.gov/sites/oss/20090SS.pdf).
232 Memorandum from Teri Takai, Chief Info. Officer (CIO), State of California, IT
Policy Letter, Subject: Open Source Software Policy (Jan. 7, 2010) (available at
http://www.cio.ca.gov/Government/IT-Policy/pdf/ITPolicy Letter_10-
01 Open Source Software.pdf).
233 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064, if 103-117 (Oct. 22, 2009).
234 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, supra note 206.
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tions that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services.""'
Additionally, all rules offered by the FCC are offer exceptions under the unde-
fined "subject to reasonable network management." Blocking certain function-
ality of applications over cellular networks or forging packets to terminate in-
terferes with the core benefits of end-to-end architecture: the ability for users
to define how to best use the Internet to serve their needs. Blocking lawful
transfers of the Bible or content is antithetical to this functionally.236 The cur-
rent rules are woefully inadequate for protecting the open Internet and explic-
itly permit providers to discriminate against Internet content and applications.
D. Broadband Truth-in-Labeling237
The Open Technology Initiative of the New America Foundation is calling
for Truth-in-Labeling by our nation's broadband operators.238 Drawn from sim-
ilar useful disclosure requirements by lenders, these Broadband Truth-in-
Labeling disclosure standards will give the marketplace a much-needed tool
that clarifies and adds meaning to the terms and conditions of the service being
offered. Broadband subscribers are often frustrated that the actual performance
of their Internet access service regularly falls far below the advertised speeds.
Consumers set their expectations based on phrases like "up to 16 Mbps," and
are disappointed to learn that these quotes are worthless assurances.
Currently, there is no lawful requirement for ISPs to reveal the contents of
the broadband services they are providing; customers might be harmed by the
invalid ambiguous language. Internet Access Providers must make meaningful
disclosures about the details of broadband offerings before subscribers sign up.
Any failure to meet make reasonable disclosures should result in a refund or
service credit to the consumer. Where there are choices between different
products or providers, disclosures should be made in a way that allows con-
sumers to compare them. Providing clear, meaningful, comparable disclosures
ultimately spurs competition between ISPs which encourages the future devel-
opment of broadband technology.
The Open Technology Initiative has created a sample Broadband Truth-in-
235 Id. at 55.
236 PETER ECKERSLEY, FRED VON LOHMANN & SETH SCHOEN, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (EFF), PACKET FORGERY BY ISPs: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR 5-6 (Nov.
28, 2007), available at http:www.eff.org/files/eff comcast report2.pdf.
237 As developed by Robb Topolski, Benjamin Lennett, Chiehyu Li, Dan Meredith,
James Losey, & Sascha Meinrath, Broadband Truth-in-Labeling, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/broadband-truth-in_labeling.
238 Id.
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Labeling disclosure. ISPs use a standardized label to notice their customers
what broadband services they are subscribing, including Internet speed, service
guarantee, prices, service limits. The Broadband Truth-in-Labeling disclosure
should be standardized to comprise several typical elements as indicators of
broadband service quality, such as minimum expected speed, latency, and ser-
vice uptime. These minimum assurances will be supported by the ISP as guar-
antees in the delivery of broadband services, backed by technical support and
service charge refunds or credits. In addition to the description of minimums
being guaranteed of the service, the disclosure should include all applicable
fees, a common description of the technology used to provide the services, any
service limits such as a bandwidth cap or the application of any traffic man-
agement techniques, the length of the contract terms, and a link to all addi-
tional terms and conditions.
Furthermore, the FCC should require disclosure any information that a con-
sumer may consider highly objectionable or surprising, such as arbitration re-
strictions or data selling. This Broadband Truth-in-Labeling must be asser-
tively presented again any time the ISP decide to alter the terms in such a way
that alters the facts on the original Broadband Truth-in-Labeling disclosure.
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On a more global level, we recommend replacing and/or dramatically ex-
panding multilateral control over important governance institutions like
ICANN. As Milton Mueller and others have documented, control over global
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communications networks and the Internet has remained Americentric.239
Moreover, purportedly representative bodies like ICANN and the Regional
Internet Registries ("RIRs") often privilege industry interests. The current
U.S.-controlled ICANN model is unsustainable over the long term and will
cause increasing problems as international uptake of the Internet increasingly
dwarfs U.S. numbers.
E. Transport Layer Solutions
We recommend policies that protect end-to-end architectures ("E2E"),
which are critical for packet-based data communications networks. E2E helps
remove vulnerabilities to bottlenecks and gate-keeping (e.g., through dynamic
routing), and protects against illegal surveillance by ISPs (e.g., through E2E
encryption). Furthermore, E2E helps speed up network throughput and in-
creases network capacity.24 o In contrast, prioritization schemes, when widely
deployed can often create substantial harm to the network throughput as well
as users. As Robb Topolski and Chris Riley explain, prioritizing some packets
while delaying others can cause packets to be dropped by many applications.
As these packets are resent the network generates "greater traffic to perform
the same communication." 241
An end-to-end architecture helps prevent both governmental and corporate
interference in network traffic at a time when surveillance and digital rights
management techniques that infringe upon our fair use rights are increasingly
prevalent. Further, we recommend mandating that service providers reveal
practices that could interfere with E2E networking.242 Network management
techniques are utilized for a number of reasons. Transparency of these prac-
tices helps customers understand the limitations of their connections, whereas
the "security through obscurity" that undergirds the argument that these prac-
tices should not be discussed has always failed over time.
239 See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS
OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (MIT Press 2010)
240 For background, see The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom,
supra note 209, at 238.
241 M. CHRIS RILEY & ROBB TOPOLSKI, FREE PRESS & NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
POLICY BRIEF THE HIDDEN HARMS OF APPLICATION BIAS 4 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the hiddenharms of application bias.
242 The open Internet rules adopted by the FCC in December 2010 left this requirement
ambiguous and up to network operators, stating that transparency should be "sufficient for
consumers to make informed decisions." See In re Matter of Preserving the Open Internet
broadband Industry Practices, supra note 206, at 1 54.
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F. Session, Presentation, and Application Layer Solutions
Interoperability harmonizes different systems and integrates foreign attach-
ments. This is especially important to the continued global expansion of
broadband service provision. As Mark Cooper and Barbara van Schewick point
out, interoperability lowers costs while increasing the collaborative potential of
the Internet.243 Interoperability is critical to ensuring that the 80% of humanity
who are not currently online will be able to interconnect with next generation
telecommunications infrastructures. 2" Thus, preventing enclosure of session-
level communications means ensuring that "reasonable network management"
techniques do not include the ability for providers to harm a particular individ-
ual because another user is utilizing substantial network resources. Likewise,
any network that limits session-level communications must be viewed with
skepticism since there is very little reason to do so if a provider is actually pro-
visioning the speeds and capacity that they have promised to their end users.
Open protocols and standards ensure an Internet free from enclosures, while
facilitating innovation and widespread adoption of new technologies. With the
growing pull towards proprietary networking (especially within the wireless
medium), it is vitally important to prevent the so-called "Balkanization" of the
Internet.245 Presentation layer protocols and standards are the building blocks
for many of the most widely utilized online applications and are a prime loca-
tion for potential digital enclosures. Ensuring the continuing democratic poten-
tial of the Internet will require continuing vigilance at the presentation levels.
Applications should be neutral. With application neutrality, Internet televi-
sion, VOIP, and diverse operating systems and services run unimpeded by any
interactions with technologies embedded within the data communications net-
work. Expected convergences in digital communications make this principle
increasingly crucial to the long-term growth and health of the Internet. Lob-
bing by the content industry to promote DRM and protect copyright, irregard-
less of these technologies' impacts on fair use rights. As exemplified by the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA") proceedings, application neu-
trality is critical factor to protect the open Internet. In much the same way that
telephone systems are neutral transport mediums for voice communications,
the Internet must remain free from discriminatory practices that privilege some
applications, services, or features over others.
243 Mark Cooper, Open Communication Platforms: Cornerstone of Innovation and De-
mocratic Discourse in the Internet Age, 2 J. of TELECOMM & HIGH TECH L. 177, 186-189
(2003); VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 1, at Ch. 8.
244 Sascha Meinrath & Victor Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward
an Open Internet, 12 INTERNET LAW 1, 19 (2008).
245 See Lawrence Lessig, The Balkanization of the Internet, LESSIGBLOG (Aug. 17,
2004), http://www.lessig.org/blog/2004/08/the balkanization-of the inter.html.
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Further, the codices that applications use to give users access to online me-
dia, as exemplified by the looming problems of the proprietary H.264 video
codex, must be free and open. Enclosing a popular medium behind a licensing
bottleneck greatly undermines the future outlook for an open Internet. Continu-
ing down this path will create new digital divides, this time thoroughly embed-
ded into the very heart of the key applications most people use to access online
content. Developers and content creators alike should be wary of license fees
through this creation of a bottleneck in the end-to-end functionality of the In-
temet. Finally, it must be ensured that new forms of "technological bundling"
that create path-dependencies we may not even know exist and contain extra
costs that may not go into effect for years, must be prevented. Given the exten-
sive and well-documented history of anti-competitive behavior within the high
tech industry, agencies like the Federal Trade Commission should investigate
how new agreements between content providers and some of the largest appli-
cation development firms on Earth are detrimentally impacting consumer wel-
fare and prevent them.
VI. CONCLUSION-THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM
Taken together, these recommendations support a new paradigm for Internet
policy. The trend in contemporary policy debates has hinged on prioritizing
benefits to the major telecommunications companies; even "new investment"
and "job creation" have become political code for profit maximizing actions by
government officials. This approach ignores that efficient and effective gov-
ernment solutions require consideration of the moral hazards, externalities and
opportunity costs that contribute to today's gaping digital divides. Addition-
ally, as van Schewick explains, there is a "gap between network provider's
private interests and the public interests."246 The time has come to return to first
principles, including a policy framework that limits vertical integration of net-
work layers in order to preserve end-to-end functionality.
A business model neutral infrastructure that allows for public players such
as municipalities and non-profits, as well as public-private partnerships and
private corporations and philanthropies, should be created to provide Internet
services. Too often, competition is lessened-and the options for consumers to
receive broadband services artificially limited-by shortsighted rules, regula-
tions, and laws crafted to lessen, rather than expand, competition. Maintaining
a neutral network requires constant intervention when the providers are limited
to specific business models or market players. This also suggests the need to
change emphases from the "OSI hourglass model" to a more nuanced approach
246 BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 388 (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press 2010).
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where the bottleneck can appear at any layer of the network and key enclosures
at one layer of the network can be leveraged to control utilization of other lay-
ers of the Internet. 247 Gaining a better understanding of how this new market
tactic works will be critical in the coming years considering the anti-
competitive behavior by chipset manufacturers in recent years.2 48
Traditionally, many researchers and advocates have focused on Layer 1 mo-
nopolies over the physical infrastructure of telecommunications networks.24 9
This is very much a hold-over from the Ma Bell and AT&T days the predate
the complexity of the Internet. However, this layer may end up being a rela-
tively modest area of concern given the other oligopolies that are developing in
plain view-with the potential for corporate deal-making that is both more
detrimental and more difficult to understand than anything we have seen previ-
ously.250 The policy battles to ensure an open Internet may be a precursor to
what lies ahead. For example, there has been little debate about the terms of
wireless chipset manufacturers even though two companies-Atheros (recently
acquired by Qualcomm) and Broadcom-may control 47% of key Wi-Fi chip-
set markets.2 S' This means that a de-facto duopoly control could leverage their
control into almost every layer of the OSI model (from how physical commu-
nications are set up to which applications can run over them). (Qualcomm con-
trolled 69% of the CDMA chipset market share as of 2009,252 and 77% of wire-
247 The OSI hourglass model traditionally conceptualizes the main bottleneck within
Internet service provision as the transport layer (e.g., the TCP protocol). The notion is that
most Internet traffic must go through this one facet and therefore it becomes an essential
component for maintaining open communications. See Steve Deering, Watching the Waist
of the Protocol Hourglass, (Presentation for Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Aug.
2001),available at http://www.iab.org/documents/docs/hourglass-london-ietf.pdf.
248 Intel has raised anti-trust concerns in both in the E.U., see David Lawsky, EU to find
Intel anti-competitive: sources, REUTERS (May 10, 2009, 2:22 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5491Q820090510; and the U.S., see Donald Mel-
anson, Intel and FTC settle charges of anticompetitive conduct, ENGADGET (Aug. 4, 2010,
1:20 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2010/08/04/intel-and-ftc-settle-charges-of-
anticompetitive-conduct/.
249 See e.g., Mark Cooper, Open Communications Platforms: The Physical Infrastructure
as the Bedrock of Innovation and democratic Discourse in the Internet Age, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM & HIGH TECH L. 177, 202-07 (2003); Glenn A. Woroch, Peeling the "Layered
Regulation " Onion, published in FREE RIDE: DEFICIENCIES OF THE MCI "LAYERED" POLICY
MODEL AND THE NEED FOR PRINCIPLES THAT ENCOURAGE COMPETITION IN THE NEW IP
WORLD 27-29 (New Millennium Res. Council, July 2004), available at
http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/news/071304 report.pdf.
250 We do not intend to undermine concerns posed by carrier consolidation, such as the
pending AT&T and T-Mobile merger, only that there are unseen and pressing concerns.
251 Zack Equity Research, Qualcomm Acquiring Atheros, YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 6, 2011,
2:40 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Qualcomm-Acquiring-zacks-
2406946883.html?x=0.
252 Manikandan Raman, Intel Narrows the Gap With Qualcomm, IBTIMES.COM (Sept.
2010), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/09/08/intel-narrows-the-gap-with-
476 [Vol. 19
Digital Feudalism
less chipsets in android devices.253) This is an area that has far outpaced com-
munications research and policy debates.
Of course, other layers (often called "Layer 8") are not accounted for in the
OSI model but should be investigated with equal vigor. These layers (from the
political to economic to finance) are beyond the scope of this paper, but clearly
interact with other layers and help define the parameters of contemporary and
future communications networks. This analysis does not preclude these addi-
tional complexities (nor is it necessarily meant to supersede them); the key
point is that communications systems and their democratic potential are far too
precious to leave to the whims of the market.
The democratic potential of an Internet commons for hundreds of mil-
lions of families, businesses, educational institutions, municipalities, and
NGOs is unparralled. High-speed access should no longer be considered a
commodity, but rather a critical utility on par with water and electricity. How-
ever, the social and economic value of the Internet depends on preventing the
threats of enclosures at every layer of the OSI stack. Our national policies have
focused on connectivity and universal access with limited discussion on adop-
tion, affordable speeds, competition, and maximizing the utility of a connec-
tion. Furthermore, policymakers have taken a timid approach to ensuring an
open Internet, explicitly allowing discrimination on wireless infrastructures.254
Policymakers looked on while the U.S.'s international ranking for Internet
adoption has plummeted-a reality that is leaving tens of millions of Ameri-
cans without broadband. Unfortunately, those who do have access experience
an increasingly controlled experience that is far more expensive and far slower
than that of a growing list of countries overseas.
The current path will inevitably lead to a tiered society, one divided along
unequal opportunities for education and work, as well as access to arts, culture,
and a higher quality of life. From a National Broadband Plan pushing for large-
ly different speeds between urban populations and the remaining quarter of the
population to investing in outdated technology,255 the current policy framework
qualcomm.aspx
253 Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights: Qualcomm, Atheros Communications, Hewlett-
Packard, Microsoft and Broadcom, ZACKS,
www.zacks.com/stock/news/45594/Zacks+Analyst+Blog+Highlights%3A+Qualcomm,+Ath
eros+Communications,+Hewlett-Packard,+Microsoft+and+Broadcom.
254 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, supra note 206, at
17962, 104 ("Although some commenters support applying the no unreasonable discrimi-
nation rule to mobile broadband . . . we decline to do so, preferring at this time to put in
place basic openness protections and monitor the development of the mobile broadband
marketplace.").
255 JAMES LOSEY, CHIEHYU LI, SASCHA MEINRATH, BROADBAND SPEEDS IN PERSPECTIVE:
A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL BROADBAND GOALS FROM AROUND THE GLOBE (Mar. 25,
2010), available at
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supports a status quo that has clearly failed.256 These asymmetries run counter
to the normative ideals of American self-determination and support of democ-
racy. These principles hold that our nation was not designed to maintain an
aristocracy and a permanent underclass, but was supposed to be a meritocracy
where anyone could succeed and everyone was given the tools they needed to
create a better life for themselves and their families.
Broadband connectivity is the new critical infrastructure of the 21st century
and is the platform on which a growing percentage of all media is transported.
Universal broadband should be a national imperative, particularly for rural,
low-income, and other underserved constituencies. It is too precious a resource
to be solely overseen by an oligopoly of profit-driven corporations who must
care for their bottom line first and foremost. Our lack of foresight and attention
to ongoing digital divides and threaten our community and national economic,
and it also threatens our future prospects, not just among marginalized con-
stituencies within the United States, but also in relation to our international
competitiveness. The U.S. has thus far failed to grasp the lesson that the past
ten years have been teaching us, but it is not too late to reform our efforts. If
the U.S. government elevates affordable Internet access to a top priority and
expands open access infrastructure requirements, all Americans will have an
opportunity to better their lives and pay prices equivalent to many other coun-
tries. The U.S. government must create the same conditions that have fostered
broadband competition in other countries-anything less will ensure that the
price-gouging and substandard services that many consumers face will con-
tinue. Buildout of open access wireline infrastructures and increased unli-
censed and opportunistic access to the public airwaves is a logical place to
start. In addition to fostering increased competition, an open Internet architec-
ture needs to be protected by maintaining interoperability, network neutrality,
and non-proprietary protocols.
While much has been made of the Obama Administration's commitment to
the Open Internet, the Genachowski FCC instead adopted woefully inadequate
rules. Definitive policy shifts are needed to create a more democratic commu-
nications system. Indeed, we stand at a critical juncture, one that may herald a
new age of democratic potential. The key question is whether this untapped
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Broadband%20Speeds%20in%
20Perspective.pdf; Nate Anderson, 4Mbps broadband for all to cost $23 billion, won't use
fiber, ARS TECHNICA (May 10, 2010, 11:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/05/4mbps-broadband-for-all-to-cost-23-billion-wont-use-fiber.ars.
256 See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, The Third Way: A Nar-
rowly Tailored Broadband Framework, Statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski 4-5,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A.pdf (May 6,
2010). Chairman Genachowski states "The goal is to restore the broadly supported status
quo."
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promise will be harnessed. Taken together, our proposed measures will help
create an open, affordable Internet available to all-one that preserves a 21st
century public sphere as an open commons defined by its users.

